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I. INTRODUCTION
December 22, 1995, the Private Securities Litigation Reform

Act' became law when the Senate overrode President Clinton's
veto.2 The House of Representatives had overridden the President's veto two days earlier. 3 For the first time, Congress restricted the
reach of "civil RICO," the expansive private treble-damage remedy created by the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970
4
(RICO).
Ever since the so-called "civil RICO explosion" began in the early
1980s, private plaintiffs had joined civil RICO claims in litigation and arbitration alleging wrongs also actionable under other sources of law, including the federal securities acts. 5 Except where the defendant is
convicted in connection with the underlying fraud, the 1995 Act removes
civil RICO from claims actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of
securities. 6 Civil RICO continues to apply in full force outside the securities context.
This Securities Symposium provides an opportunity to evaluate civil
RICO's place in American law at the end of the private remedy's first
quarter-century. In its essence, civil RICO is the unfortunate product of
crime legislation hastily enacted in the heat of a national political campaign. Rushing toward adjournment, Congress enacted RICO on October 12, 1970 as Title IX of the omnibus Organized Crime Control Act
(OCCA).7 President Nixon signed the OCCA on October 15.8 Less than
three weeks later, Americans preoccupied with crime went to the polls in
off-year congressional elections after a shrill campaign dominated by "law
and order" rhetoric from the President and Congress alike. 9
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995).
2. See 141 CONG. REC. S19,146-54, S19,180 (1995). The President's veto message appears at 141 CONG. REC. HI5,214-16 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
3. 141 CONG. REC. H15,223-24 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
4. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).

5. See DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS,

THE LAW OF CIVIL

RICO §§ 1.1-1.3, 2.10, 5.3.3 (1991 &

Supp. 1996).
6. See Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 107, 109 Stat. 737, 758 (1995), which is quoted infra text
accompanying note 189.
7. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994)).
8. See President Nixon's Remarks on Signing the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, PUB. PAPERS 846 (Oct. 15, 1970) [hereinafter President Nixon's Remarks].
9. Concerning the law-and-order climate in 1970, see, e.g., ROWLAND EVANS, JR. &
ROBERT D. NOVAK, NIXON IN THE WHITE HOUSE: THE FRUSTRATION OF POWER 303-46
(1971); WILLIAM SAFIRE, BEFORE THE FALL: AN INSIDE VIEW OF THE PRE-WATERGATE
WHITE HOUSE 316-40 (1975); TOM WICKER, ONE OF Us: RICHARD NIXON AND THE
AMERICAN DREAM 635-39 (1991). During House and Senate debates on the OCCA bill,
supporters and opponents alike perceived organized crime and racketeering as symptoms
of an incipient national breakdown of law and order. See infra notes 91, 129 and accompanying text.
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RICO's goal was to eliminate the infiltration of organized crime and
racketeering into businesses, labor unions, and other legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce.' 0 The legislation followed on the
heels of the 1967 report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, the "Katzenbach Commission." '
The Commission had found that organized crime was "extensively and
deeply involved" in these legitimate organizations and that it "employ[ed] illegitimate methods-monopolization, terrorism, extortion, tax
12
evasion-to drive out and control lawful ownership and leadership.'

Congress sought to achieve the goal with a three-prong attack. RICO
authorizes the government to move against defendants in criminal prosecutions, 13 civil proceedings,' 4 or both. Whether or not the government
has moved against a particular person, civil RICO authorizes private persons to sue and recover treble damages and costs, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, for injury to their business or property caused by a RICO
5
violation.1
RICO's story illustrates the dangers inherent in congressional consideration of high-profile crime bills amid the passions of a political campaign.
In the months preceding the OCCA's enactment, Congress paid virtually
no attention to the likely efficacy of private RICO relief because RICO
included only the government's civil and criminal remedies until late in
the deliberation process.' 6 When the private remedy was inserted shortly
before the final House and Senate votes on the OCCA bill, the
lawmakers were racing against the clock to pass crime legislation before
adjourning for last-minute campaigning. In their haste to appear before
the electorate as "tough on crime," they enacted civil RICO with "only
abbreviated discussion,"1 7 and without anticipating the breadth of its ultimate operation.
10. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
11. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1969) [hereinafter CHALLENGE OF CRIME].

The Commission was popularly known by the name of its chairman, U.S. Attorney General
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach.
12. Id. at 187.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1994).
14. Id. § 1964(a), (b).
15. Id. § 1964(c), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). Civil RICO is
thus a civil remedy designed to enlist "private attorneys general" in the battle against persons RICO identifies as criminals. Because civil RICO was enacted as an integral part of
crime legislation, the story of its enactment and operation yields lessons relevant to congressional consideration of such legislation.
The 1995 Securities Litigation Reform Act amended only 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), the provision creating civil RICO, the private treble-damages remedy. The 1995 Act left untouched
the government's criminal and civil remedies created by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963 and 1964(a),
(b), respectively.
16. Civil RICO also largely escaped the media's attention. For example, in their accounts of the October 15 presidential signing ceremony, the Washington Post and the New
York Times made no mention of the private remedy. Rather, the focus was on RICO's
criminal remedy and on OCCA provisions designed to combat terrorist bombings.
ABRAMS, supra note 5, § 1.1, at 2.
17. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
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If Congress had debated civil RICO dispassionately, the lawmakers
might have anticipated that the private remedy would have little or no
effect on the fight against organized crime and racketeering. How many
"private attorneys general" would have the temerity to sue organized
crime members and racketeers in open court for treble damages?
Dispassionate debate might also have led Congress to recognize the
dangers lurking when a statute creates criminal and private civil causes of
action dependent on proof of expansive congruent elements. RICO operates against conduct, not status. 18 In the effort to enact effective antiracketeering legislation, Congress declined to prohibit membership in

organized crime or in identifiable organized-crime groups. Not only did
the lawmakers understand that proving organized-crime membership had
traditionally been difficult and frequently impossible; 19 they also concluded that an express organized-crime prohibition might have led courts
20
to strike down RICO for creating an unconstitutional status offense.

Congress sought to reach racketeering not by legislating against racketeers directly, but by legislating against the conduct in which racketeers
were thought to engage. Because Congress sought to cast the widest pos-

sible net, RICO operates against much conduct that is engaged in by
racketeer and nonracketeer defendants alike.
The lawmakers cast RICO's net, however, without anticipating that
government and private plaintiffs would occupy fundamentally distinct
positions in RICO litigation. Congress sensed that RICO's expansive

language might occasionally reach beyond organized crime members and
racketeers, but the lawmakers also knew that federal prosecutors exercise
a measure of discretion and would have neither the desire nor the re2

sources to indict everyone who commits a technical RICO violation. '

Lawyers for private plaintiffs, on the other hand, exercise no such discretion. These lawyers have an ethical duty to allege technical civil RICO
violations when the allegation can be made in good faith, particularly be-

cause final judgment for the plaintiff brings enhanced damages and attorneys' fees normally unavailable where suit is brought solely on non18. See, e.g., United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1541 (9th Cir.) (criminal
RICO prosecution), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866 (1988); United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d
963, 983 (3d Cir. 1985) (same), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1110 (1986).
19. See, e.g., Stephen Horn, When to Bring a Racketeering Claim, 9 LITIGATION 33, 34
(1983) ("With all the effort that the federal government has devoted to the pursuit of organized crime, it has been able to produce only one witness to take the stand and testify to
the existence of an organized criminal underworld.").
20. See 116 CONG. REC. 35,343-46 (1970).
21. See Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S.30 and Related Measures Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,91st Cong., 1st Sess. 346-47, 424 (1969) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]. See also
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 28 (2d rev. ed. 1988)
(emphasizing prosecutional discretion and detailing the requisite factors necessary to establish a RICO violation); Paul E. Coffey, The Selection, Analysis, and Approval of Federal
RICO Prosecutions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1041-42 (1990).

1996]

LESSONS FROM CIVIL RICO

RICO causes. 22
Part II.A of this Article presents the OCCA's legislative history, culminating in the Act's enactment on the eve of national elections. This history demonstrates that, as the names "Organized Crime Control" and
"Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations" themselves indicate,
RICO was aimed at organized crime and racketeering. Consistent with
the Katzenbach Commission's findings, Congress's targets were the "Mafia" and the "Cosa Nostra." The Commission, Congress, and President
Nixon perceived these targets as tightly knit, relatively small and frequently violent groups that helped finance their infiltration of legitimate
enterprises with proceeds from such socially pernicious activities as illicit
gambling, drug trafficking, loan-sharking, and prostitution.
Part II.B discusses civil RICO's operation in the quarter-century since
its enactment. RICO's expansive language reaches much conduct (particularly fraudulent conduct) committed by ordinary defendants who have
no connection whatsoever with "organized crime" and "racketeering," as
Congress and the President understood these terms in 1970. This expansiveness has enabled civil RICO to operate as a general antifraud remedy, regardless of the defendant's status or other circumstance. Nowhere
in the legislative history did Congress hint that it had any idea such a
turnabout would occur. The unanticipated outcome has profoundly affected American law because civil RICO has federalized the regulation of
much conduct that had been the subject of state regulation since the earliest days of the Republic.
Whatever the efficacy of the government's RICO remedies, civil RICO
has had no perceptible effect on the fight against organized crime and
racketeering. The private remedy has also squandered valuable judicial
resources by burdening the federal courts with actions whose complexity
far exceeds even their considerable numbers. 23 The District of Columbia
Circuit Court has aptly called RICO "one of the most confusing crimes
ever devised by" Congress. 24 Part III of this Article describes civil
RICO's complexity and the peculiar burdens the private remedy has imposed on the judiciary.
Part IV presents lessons Congress and the President should learn from
the mistakes that dominated enactment of civil RICO a generation ago.
Civil RICO's ultimate failure demonstrates what can happen when Con22. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1, 1.3, 3.1 (1994)
(rules requiring attorneys to competently pursue only meritorious claims and to represent
clients diligently and promptly); In Defense of RICO, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 16, 1989, at 4,
53 (in civil RICO suits, "private lawyers know no restraint except the limits of their
imaginations").
23. The Supreme Court has held that state courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising under civil RICO. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990).
Most civil RICO claims nonetheless are heard in federal court, either because plaintiffs file
suit there initially or because state suits containing civil RICO claims are typically removed
to federal court.
24. Casey v. Department of State, 980 F.2d 1472, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1992). See also other
decisions cited infra notes 277-83.
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gress legislates in an evident effort to appear "tough on crime," but without carefully considering the legislation's long-term effects on crime and
on the federal courts' institutional capacities. Part III concludes by discussing aspects of the debates throughout the early 1990s that culminated
in enactment of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994.25 These debates, still fresh in our memories, suggest that the lessons of the unfortunate civil RICO experience have yet to be learned.
With new efforts to enact crime legislation likely in these turbulent times,
the lessons command our continued national attention.
II. CIVIL RICO'S FIRST QUARTER-CENTURY
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: "TOTAL WAR AGAINST
ORGANIZED CRIME"

26

In the halls of Congress, organized crime and racketeering were not
matters of fresh concern in the late 1960s. 27 In 1951, for example, Sena-

tor Estes Kefauver's Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime
in Interstate Commerce had examined the infiltration of government and
legitimate business by these groups. 28 A decade later, Senator John L.
McClellan's Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor and
Management Field had examined the groups' infiltration of labor
unions.29
In July of 1965, however, President Lyndon B. Johnson rekindled congressional interest when he established the Katzenbach Commission. 30
The President charged the Commission, among other things, with defining the menace posed by organized crime and racketeering and with de31 Calling organized crime "nothing
veloping strategies for combatting it.
less than a guerilla war against society," 32 the President stressed the need
for immediate, sustained action. Organized crime, he said, "takes scores
of lives each year in gangland violence," "terrorizes thousands of our citi25. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
26. President Nixon's Remarks, supra note 8, at 846.
27. See generally Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalizationof Crime, 22
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 213 (1984) (tracing history of federal antiracketeering legislation).

28. See SENATE SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE, INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 2370, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); SECOND IN-

TERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); THIRD INTERIM REPORT, S.
REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 725, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1951); see also DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE FIFTIES 188-94 (1993) (discussing the

Kefauver Committee); WILLIAM HOWARD
POLITICS OF CRIME 1950-1952 (1974).

MOORE, TiE KEFAUVER COMMrrEE AND THE

29. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR AND MAN-

AGEMENT FIELD, S. REP. No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 487 (1960).
30. Exec. Order No. 11,236, 3 C.F.R. 9349 (1965) (establishing the Commission), reprinted in Statement by the President on Establishing the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 2 PUB. PAPERS 785 (July 26, 1965).
31. See Remarks to the Members of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice, 2 PuB. PAPERS 982, 983 (Sept. 8, 1965) ("I want to know
why organized crime continues to expand despite our best efforts to prevent it.").
32. Remarks at a Meeting with Federal Enforcement Officials to Deal with the Prob-

lem of Organized Crime, 1 PUB. PAPERS 483 (May 5, 1966).
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zens," and drains billions of dollars through "illegal gambling, narcotics,
33
prostitution, loan-sharking, arson, and other forms of racketeering.
Heeding President Johnson's call, the Katzenbach Commission's 1967
report urged Congress and the states to "make a full-scale commitment to
destroy the power of organized crime groups. '34 Consistent with the
President's perceptions, the Commission found that the activities of organized crime and racketeering ranged from "gambling, loan-sharking,
narcotics, and other forms of vice" to "monopolization, terrorism, extortion, [and] tax evasion."'35 After investigation and analysis, the Commission reported on "the common ethnic tie of the 5,000 or more members
of organized crime's core groups":36
Today the core of organized crime in the United States consists of 24
groups operating as criminal cartels in large cities across the Nation.
Their membership is exclusively Italian, they are in frequent communication with each other, and their smooth functioning is insured by
a national body of overseers .... FBI intelligence indicates that the
organization as a whole has changed its name from the Mafia to La
Cosa Nostra.... Organized crime in its totality.., consists of these
to form a loose confed24 groups allied with other racket enterprises
37
eration operating in large and small cities.
malefactors
The Commission concluded that these "exclusively Italian"
38
engaged in "the most sinister kind of crime in America."
The men who control [organized crime] have become rich and powerful by encouraging the needy to gamble, by luring the troubled to
destroy themselves with drugs, by extorting the profits of honest and
hardworking businessmen, by collecting usury from those in financial
plight, by maiming or murdering those who oppose them, by bribing
those who are sworn to destroy them .... As the leaders of Cosa
Nostra and their racketeering allies pursue their conspiracy unmolested, in open and continued defiance of the law, they preach a
sermon that all too many Americans heed: The government is for
sale; lawlessness is the39road to wealth; honesty is a pitfall and morality a trap for suckers.
The Katzenbach Commission report profoundly influenced Congress
33. Id. See also Special Message to the Congress on Crime and Law Enforcement:
"To Insure the Public Safety," 1 PUB. PAPERS 183, 192 (Feb. 7, 1968) ("Organized crime['s]
...sinister effect pervades too many corners of America today-through gambling, loansharking, corruption, extortion, and large movements of narcotics.... It is clear that sporadic, isolated attacks on this disciplined army of the underworld cannot obtain lasting
results."); Special Message to the Congress on Crime in America, 1 PUB. PAPERS 134, 144
(Feb. 6, 1967) ("Criminal syndicates do not recognize state boundaries. Their impact is
frequently nation-wide. The Federal government's responsibility in combatting organized
crime is clear and unequivocal."); Memorandum on the Federal Government's Drive
Against Organized Crime 1 PUB.PAPERS 484 (May 5, 1966) ("Organized crime constitutes
one of the most serious threats to a peaceful and prosperous society.").
34. CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 11, at 200.
35. Id. at 187.
36. Id. at 192.
37. Id. at 192-93.
38. Id. at 209.
39. Id. at 209-10.
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throughout the deliberations that produced RICO three years later. 40
The first congressional efforts to implement the Commission's recommendations concerning organized crime and racketeering were Senate
Bills 2048 and 2049, introduced by Senator Roman L. Hruska (R-Neb.)
41
on June 29, 1967, four months after the Commission report appeared.
In a floor speech replete with discussion of the report, 42 Senator Hruska
stated that "[o]rganized crime in the United States is a tightly knit and
strictly disciplined criminal cartel. The largest organization is, of course,
La Cosa Nostra. '4 3 The bills would have amended federal antitrust laws
to reach "[t]he illegal activities of organized crime-gambling, narcotics,
loan-sharking, prostitution, extortion, and the rest." 44 These activities,
Senator Hruska explained, produced substantial revenue, some of which
'45
was then "funneled into legitimate business.
Senate Bill 2048 would have made it a violation of federal antitrust
46
laws to invest intentionally unreported income in a business enterprise.
Senate Bill 2049 would have made it a crime to apply the income received
from enumerated criminal activities to a business enterprise. 47 The bills
would have subjected violators to existing criminal and civil antitrust
48
remedies, including treble damages.
Congressman Richard H. Poff (R-Va.) introduced companion legislation in the House of Representatives the same day.49 Like Senator
Hruska, Representative Poff discussed the Katzenbach Commission report and charged "organized crime's overlords" with engaging in such
activities as "gambling, bribery, extortion, counterfeiting, narcotics traffic,
and white slavery." 50 Representative Poff's cosponsors shared his per51
ception of the bills' intended targets.
No action was taken on the Hruska or Poff bills, but the American Bar
Association's Antitrust Section studied and reported on them in 1969.
The Section's report cited and quoted from the Katzenbach Commis40. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. Despite (and perhaps because of) the
Commission's perception that organized crime members and racketeers were "exclusively
Italian," the congressional debates that produced RICO do not reveal that any of the 535
senators and House members ever noticed the unseemliness of concocting a convoluted
name that produced the patently ethnic acronym "RICO."
41. 113 CONG. REC. 17,997 (1967).
42. Id. at 17,997-18,005.
43. Id. at 17,998.
44. Id.
45. Id.

46. Id. at 17,999.
47. Id.
48. Id.

49. Id. at 17,946-47.
50. Id. at 17,947 (discussing "syndicated crime," "organized crime's overlords," and
"the crime syndicate").
51. See id. at 17,948 (remarks of Rep. Hutchinson) ("interstate criminal syndicates");
id. at 17,949 (remarks of Rep. Wilson) ("organized crime syndicates" and "the underworld"); id. (remarks of Rep. Meskill) ("the continued underground existence of criminal
syndicates"); id. at 17,950-51 (remarks of Rep. McClory) ("notorious criminal syndicate
leaders," "syndicate revenue," and "organized crime lords").
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sion's recommendations concerning the need for legislation to combat organized crime. 52 The Section agreed that "[t]he time tested machinery of
the antitrust laws contains several useful and workable features which are
appropriate for use against organized crime," including a private trebledamages remedy. 53 The Section warned, however, that "use of antitrust
laws themselves as a vehicle for combating organized crime could create
inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in the way of persons injured by
organized crime who might seek treble damage recovery. ' 54 The Section
called for "legislation having the purposes of adapting the machinery of
the antitrust laws to the prosecution of organized crime," but "recommend[ed] that any such legislation be enacted as an independent statute
and not be included in the Sherman Act, or any other antitrust law." 55
Congressional activity resumed on January 15, 1969, when Senator McClellan (D-Ark.) introduced Senate Bill 30, the Organized Crime Control
Act, which did not contain a title on the ultimate RICO model.56 Senators Hruska and Sam J. Ervin (D-N.C.) joined as cosponsors. 57 Senator
McClellan told his colleagues that the Act's various titles sought to implement several Katzenbach Commission recommendations concerning organized crime and racketeering. 58 The Act, he said, targeted "a separate
society, composed of closely organized and strictly disciplined criminals,"
marked by "its ability to milk, bilk, extort, maim, and murder. '59 The
"separate society" consisted of "[twenty-four] Cosa Nostra groups oper'60
ating as criminal cartels in the major metropolitan areas of our Nation.
In a Senate floor speech on March 11, Senator McClellan spoke in considerable detail about the identity and activities of the targets of Senate
Bill 30.61 Frequently quoting from the Katzenbach Commission report,
the Senator identified "[t]he most influential core groups of organized
crime, the 'families' of La Cosa Nostra. '' 62 "The hierarchical structure of
the families," he explained, "closely parallels that of Mafia groups that
operated for almost a century on the island of Sicily."' 63 These families,
he continued, were "substantially different from other criminal operations" because they had "enforcers" and "corrupters." 64 Enforcers
"maintain[ed] organizational integrity by arranging for the maiming and
killing of recalcitrant members or potential witnesses against the
52. 115 CONG. REc. 6994, 6995 (1969).
53. Id. at 6995.
54. Id. As examples of potential obstacles, the report pinpointed "a body of precedent
. . . setting strict requirements on questions such as 'standing to sue' and 'proximate
cause.' Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 769.
57. Id. at 827.
58. Id. at 827-29; see also id. at 5877 (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
59. Id. at 827.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 5872.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 5873.
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group"; 65 corrupters "[sought] to establish relations with those public officials and other influential persons whose
assistance is necessary to
66
achieve the organization's overall goals."
Senator McClellan told his colleagues that organized crime's "greatest
source of revenue" was syndicated gambling, followed by drug trafficking
(particularly in heroin) and loan-sharking. 67 He also said that organized
68
crime had begun to infiltrate legitimate businesses and labor unions.
On March 20, Senator Hruska invoked the Katzenbach Commission
report when he introduced Senate Bill 1623, the Criminal Activities Profits Act, which included many concepts from his two 1967 bills.69 The Sen-

ator began his floor speech by stating that he found it "inherently
offensive" that "racketeers... who are purveyors in murder and mayhem
are at the same time dealing in lawful products and services for law abiding citizenry."' 70 He explained that Senate Bill 1623 was "aimed specifically at racketeer infiltration of legitimate business" with funds gained

from such activities as "gambling, loan-sharking, [and] narcotics trafficking. ''7 1 The Act drew heavily on antitrust procedures and remedies but,
heeding the ABA Antitrust Section's recent recommendation, would
have amended Title 18 of the United States Code (the "Crimes and Criminal Procedure" title) rather than existing antitrust statutes. 72 The Act
73
included a private treble-damage remedy.
During Senate Judiciary Committee hearings in mid-March on Senate
Bills 30 and 1623, lawmakers and witnesses alike shared the perceptions
of organized crime and racketeering identified by the Katzenbach Com-

mission and Senators McClellan and Hruska. 74 After a few days of hear65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 5873-74.
Id. See also Senate Hearings,supra note 21, at 229-30 (remarks of Sen. McClellan):
You know, when we get disturbed about a condition, we are prone, I guess,
sometimes to exaggerate. I do not think that we should do that in this crime
situation. I think we should try to hold it just to what the real facts are.... I
certainly do not desire to use scare tactics, but I think we must deal with the
problem realistically.
69. 115 CONG. REC. 6925 (1969).
70. Id. at 6993.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 6995.
73. Id. at 6996.
74. See Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 108. Attorney General John N. Mitchell
remarked:
Organized crime is America's principal supplier of illegal goods and services,
such as gambling, easily obtainable but usurious loans, narcotics and illicit
drugs, prostitution, and other forms of vice .... [OIrganized crime is increasingly operating in fields of legitimate business, where it employs such illegitimate techniques as bankruptcy frauds, tax evasion, extortion, terrorism,
arson, and monopolization.
Id. See also id. at 151 (statement of Sen. Hruska) ("There is no greater scourge in this
nation than the deliberate use of violence and vice that is the trademark of organized
crime."); id. at 163 (remarks of Sen. Tydings) ("You are dealing with a virtual hydra, with
almost unlimited resources and powers of regeneration when you are talking about the
Mafia, the Cosa Nostra, the organized criminal elements in this country."); id. at 175 (state-
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ings, the two Senators introduced Senate Bill 1861, the "Corrupt
Organizations Act," on April 18.75 The bill, which resembled the ultimately enacted RICO, authorized the government to seek criminal sanctions and equitable relief under Title 18, but did not create a private right
76
of action.
In a special message to Congress on April 23, President Nixon

presented his Program to Combat Organized Crime in America. 77 The

Message voiced support for legislation to combat "the 24 Cosa Nostra
families," which he described as an "alien organization ...a totalitarian
and closed society operating within an open and democratic one."'78 Con-

sistent with the Katzenbach Commission's perceptions, the President
stated that organized crime "relies on physical terror and psychological
intimidation, on economic retaliation and political bribery ....,,79 "Its
economic base," he continued, "is principally derived from its virtual monopoly of illegal gambling, the numbers racket, and the importation of
narcotics. To a large degree, it underwrites the loan-sharking business in
the United States and actively participates in fraudulent bankruptcies. ' 80
Sounding the law-and-order theme, the President asserted that organized
crime "encourages street crime by inducing narcotics addicts to mug and
rob. It encourages housebreaking and burglary by providing efficient dis81
posal methods for stolen goods.
The Judiciary Committee reported an amended Senate Bill 30, the Organized Crime Control Act, to the full Senate on January 21, 1970.82 The

Committee report reiterated that "the most influential core groups of organized crime" were "the 'families' of La Cosa Nostra," whose "hierarchical structure ... closely parallels that of Mafia groups that operated
for almost a century on the island of Sicily."'83 On the Senate floor, Senator McClellan told his colleagues that the bill embodied the best of the
Katzenbach Commission's recommendations concerning organized crime
and racketeering.8 4 The former Senate Bill 1861, still without provision
ment of Paul J. Curran, Chairman, N.Y. State Comm'n of Investigation) ("From gambling,
narcotics, and loan-sharking [organized crime] has extended its tentacles into the field of
commerce and industry .... [T]he means used by racketeers to penetrate and to gain
control of legitimate business, or simply to engage in extortion, ranged from old-fashioned
muscle and violence to ...more sophisticated techniques .. ");id. at 273-74 (remarks of
John P. Diuguid, Counsel, Ass'n of Fed. Investigators) ("The principal areas in which organized crime is involved are: gambling, loan-sharking, narcotics traffic, extortion, labor
racketeering, and the corruption of public officials.").
75. 115 CONG. Rc. 9512 (1969).
76. Id. at 9567, 9569.
77. See Special Message to the Congress on a Program to Combat Organized Crime in
America, PUB. PAPERS 315 (Apr. 23, 1969) [hereinafter Special Message to Congress].
78. Id. at 316.
79. Id. at 315-16; see also Special Message to the Congress on the Administration's
Legislative Program, PUB. PAPERS 719, 728 (Sept. 11, 1970) (discussing organized crime's
illegal gambling and drug trafficking activities).
80. Special Message to Congress, supra note 77, at 315.
81. Id.
82. 116 CONG. REC. 575 (1970).
83. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 36.
84. 115 CONG. REc. 39,906 (1969).
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for a private right of action, was included as
Title IX and named Racket85
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations.

In the Judiciary Committee report, Senators Philip A. Hart and Edward M. Kennedy published a separate statement warning that Senate
Bill 30 reached "beyond organized criminal activity."'86 The six-sentence
statement objected that the bill proposed "substantial changes in the general body of criminal procedures," and established "new rules of evidence

and procedure applicable to all criminal jurisprudence. '87 The two Senators expressed disapproval that the bill had not been "[almended to restrict its scope solely to organized criminal activity and to assure the
protection of individual rights." 88
With Senate Bill 30 still not containing a private right of action, Senate
debate on the bill began on January 20, 1970.89 Senator McClellan

opened the debate by reiterating that "the bill incorporate[d] the best of
the recommendations" of the Katzenbach Commission designed to strike
at the "families of La Cosa Nostra." 90 During the brief ensuing debate,

other Senators favorably cited the Commission's findings and recommendations concerning organized crime and racketeering. 91
Throughout the debate, Senators left no doubt about Senate Bill 30's

85. 116 CONG. REc. 581-83 (1970).
86. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 215 (statements of Sen. Hart and Sen. Kennedy). See also 116 CONG. Rcc. 845 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) (reiterating criticism that
the bill went "far beyond organized criminal activity").
87. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 215.
88. Id.
89. 116 CONG. REC. 393 (1970).
90. Id. at 585 (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
91. Id. at 601 (remarks of Sen. Hruska) (OCCA "adopt[s] ... the best features of the
recommendations" of the Commission); id. at 606 (remarks of Sen. Byrd); id. at 845 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); id. at 962 (remarks of Sen. Murphy); id. at 970 (remarks of Sen.
Bible). Supporters and opponents alike perceived organized crime and racketeering as
symptoms of an incipient nationwide breakdown of "law and order." Id. at 586 (remarks
of Sen. McClellan) (La Cosa Nostra's success is "symbolic of the breakdown of law and
order increasingly characteristic of our society."); id. at 600 (remarks of Sen. McClellan)
(OCCA "can have a significant effect in reducing street crime ... across the Nation."); id.
at 601 (remarks of Sen. Hruska) ("Crime and the very fear of crime are daily eroding the
basic quality of life of millions of American. Nowhere is this erosion more critical than in
the field of organized crime."); id. at 606 (remarks of Sen. Byrd) ("Organized crime is just
as great a threat to the well-being of our Nation as are the continued upsurge of street
violence and the work of militants who seek to burn down our cities or destroy our educational institutions."); id. (remarks of Sen. Byrd) (discussing "devotion to law and order");
id. at 844 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) ("[O]rganized crime ... is perhaps the single factor
most responsible for the frightening increase in street crime."); id. at 952 (remarks of Sen.
Thurmond) ("[T]he growth of organized crime has contributed greatly to crime in the
streets.").
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95
targets: "the Cosa Nostra," 92 "the Mafia," 93 "the mob," 94 "gangsters,"

"the underworld," 96 "families," 97 and "syndicates.

' 98

Lawmakers

stressed the targets' involvement in such nefarious activities as gambling,
drug trafficking, prostitution, loan-sharking, bootlegging, usury, robbery,

larceny, and arson.99
Senators also expressed concern about organized crime's capacity to
infiltrate legitimate business and labor unions. Senator McClellan told

his colleagues that "the mob" ordinarily achieved infiltration through
10 0
"terror tactics," "violence," and "its rigidly enforced code of silence."'
Senate debate concluded with Senate Bill 30's passage on January 23,
with only one dissenting vote. Title IX was RICO, which granted the
government a criminal remedy and civil remedies for injunctive and other
92. See, e.g., id. at 585-86 (remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("[Tihe most influential of [the
organized crime groups] are the 26 families of La Cosa Nostra," whose "internal organization ...

is patterned after the ancient Mafia groups of Sicily."); id. at 592-95 (remarks of

Sen McClellan); id. at 607 (remarks of Sen. Byrd); id. at 846 (remarks of Sen. McClellan);
id. at 952, 953 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond) (discussing the "insidious and invisible empire
designated by various names, the best known of which are the Mafia and the Cosa Nostra"); id. at 956 (remarks of Sen. Hruska); id. at 963 (remarks of Sen. McClellan) id. at 970
(remarks of Sen. Bible).
93. See, e.g., id. at 586, 589, 592, 593, 600 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); id. at 832 (remarks of Sen. Case; id. at 846 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); id. at 953 (remarks of Sen.
Thurmond); id. at 957 (remarks of Sen. Hruska).
94. See, e.g., id. at 591, 592 (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
95. See, e.g., id. at 591 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); id. at 819 (remarks of Sen. Scott).
96. See, e.g., id. at 602 (remarks of Sen. Hruska).
97. See, e.g., id. at 593 (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
98. See, e.g., id. at 591 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); id. at 819, 820 (remarks of Sen.
Scott); id. at 845 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); id. at 970 (remarks of Sen. Bible); id. at 971
(remarks of Sen. Williams).
99. See, e.g., id. at 586 (remarks of Sen. McClellan) (syndicated gambling, narcotics
importation and distribution, and loan-sharking); id. at 590-91 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); id. at 601 (remarks of Sen. Hruska) (gambling, narcotics, loan-sharking, robbery, larceny, and arson); id. at 602 (remarks of Sen. Yarborough) (narcotics distribution and
gambling); id. at 603, 605 (remarks of Sen. Allott) (gambling and narcotics); id. at 606
(remarks of Sen. Byrd) (syndicated gambling, loan-sharking, prostitution, and narcotics
trafficking); id. at 819 (remarks of Sen. Scott) (gambling, loan-sharking, narcotics, prostitution, and other forms of vice, extortion, and terrorism); id. at 844 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) (gambling and narcotics); id. at 952 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond) (narcotics,
gambling, loan-sharking, and other forms of vice); id. at 962 (remarks of Sen. Murphy)
(narcotics, gambling, and loan-sharking); id. at 970 (remarks of Sen. Bible) ("fence" operations, usury, gambling, drug traffic, and loan-sharking); id. at 971 (remarks of Sen. Williams) (narcotics distribution, gambling, and loan-sharking).
100. Id. at 590 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); see also id. at 601, 602 (remarks of Sen.
Hruska) ("[Organized crime ... has become entrenched in legitimate business and labor
unions where it employs terrorism, extortion, tax evasion, bankruptcy fraud and manipulation, and other measures"; organized crime "employs physical brutality, fear and corruption to intimidate competitors and customers to achieve increased sales and profits."); id.
at 602 (remarks of Sen. Yarborough) ("terrorizing... physical and economic threats"); id.
at 603 (remarks of sen. Allott) (organized crime's "primitive code of terror"); id. at 607
(remarks of Sen. Byrd) (discussing organized crime's "brutal and strong-arm tactics" and
"terrorism"); id. at 819 (remarks of Sen. Scott) (discussing organized crime's "laws rigidly
enforced through terror"); id. at 970 (remarks of Sen. Bible) (Organized crime's "methods
range from hoodlum intimidations to armed violence and murder.").
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equitable relief. 10 1 The title did not create a private right of action.' 0 2
On January 26, Senate Bill 30 was referred to the House Judiciary

Committee, which did not begin hearings until May 20, 1970.103 On May
23, President Nixon wrote the president of the American Bar Association
seeking his support in urging Congress to act swiftly on the bill.'0 4 The
House Committee's first witness was Senator McClellan, who again
called the OCCA "a truly comprehensive attack on the crime syndicate.' 10 5 The Senator specified the control that the Cosa Nostra and the
Mafia held over the narcotics trade and over their "biggest single illegal

activity," unlawful gambling.'

06

Later witnesses recognized that these

groups were the legislation's targets.' 0 7
Witnesses warned, however, that Title IX was broad enough to author-

ize criminal prosecution of nonracketeers.' 0 8 The Attorney General, for
example, voiced strong support for Senate Bill 30, which would provide

"innovative measures.., necessary for the effective prosecution of organized crime cases," which had resisted "the traditional law enforcement
process."109 He predicted that the bill would enable federal prosecutors
to strike at the "greatly expanded Cosa Nostra" and to loosen its grip on
illicit gambling, loan-sharking, and the drug trade." 0 He warned, however, that the OCCA contained provisions that "do not relate solely to

organized crime."

'

Concerned that some Senate Bill 30 provisions threatened constitutional guarantees, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York

cautioned against "a hasty effort to clear a path through the criminal law
to get at organized crime.""12 The Association of the Bar generally supported Title IX, but recommended that it be "sufficiently circumscribed
so as to exclude from its scope those against whom it is not directed and
101. Id. at 972.
102. Id. at 1103.
103. See Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30, and Related Proposals,Before
Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter House Hearings].
104. Letter to the President of the American Bar Association About Pending Anticrime Legislation, PUB. PAPERS 456-57 (May 23, 1970).

105. House Hearings,supra note 103, at 86. Senator McClellan stated:
Never in the history of America has organized crime had greater adverse
impact and widespread control over the social, political, and economic lives
of our citizens and institutions than it does today. Never has the national
criminal syndicate known as La Cosa Nostra managed with greater success
than now to maintain profitable operations in so many areas and in such a
variety of illegal interprises [sic].
Id.
106. Id. at 87.
107. See, e.g., id. at 151-57 (statement of Atty. Gen. John N. Mitchell); id. at 469-71
(statement of Rep. Koch).
108. See, e.g., id. at 185 (statement of Atty. Gen. John N. Mitchell).
109. Id. at 156.
110. Id. at 152-53.
111. Id. at 185.
112. Id. at 294.
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minimize the possibilities of abuse by law enforcement agencies." 113
Similarly, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) opposed Senate
Bill 30 on the ground that it contained "numerous fundamental-and in
...

many ways misguided-revisions of procedural and substantive provi-

sions cutting across the entire system of criminal law. 11 4 The ACLU
warned specifically that RICO could reach115activities that went "well beyond those associated with racketeering."
In a floor speech on June 9, Senator McClellan responded to these crit-

icisms by acknowledging that RICO might occasionally reach beyond in-

filtration of legitimate entities by organized crime. 116 "It is impossible,"
he told his colleagues, "to draw an effective statute which reaches most of
the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not include of-

fenses commonly committed by persons outside organized crime as

well." 117 The reason was straightforward: "Members of La Cosa Nostra
and smaller organized crime groups are sufficiently resourceful and enter-

prising that8one constantly is surprised by the variety of offenses that they
commit.""1

"The Senate report," Senator McClellan continued, "does not claim...
that the listed offenses are committed primarily by members of organized
crime, only that those offenses are characteristic of organized crime." 119
In an effort to allay fears that commission of such offenses by persons
outside organized crime would subject them to RICO prosecution, the
Senator stated that RICO would reach only a person who "engages in a

pattern of such violations.' 20 Senator McClellan made no mention of
any need for a private right of action.
On June 17, Representative Sam Steiger (R-Ariz.) submitted a statement for inclusion in the hearing record to the House Judiciary Committee. 121 "One possible amendment.., for your consideration would add a
private civil damage remedy similar to the private damage remedy found
113. Id. at 331.
114. Id. at 490 (statement of Lawrence Speiser, Director, American Civil Liberties
Union, Washington office). The ACLU had expressed similar views before the Senate
Committee. Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 456 (statement of Lawrence Speiser).
115. House Hearings, supra note 103, at 490.
116. 116 CONG. REc. 18,912 (1970). Senator McClellan began by reiterating that Senate Bill 30 incorporated the best of the recommendations of the Katzenbach Commission.
Id. He explained that RICO sought to remove organized crime from legitimate organizations by arming the government with three primary devices-criminal forfeiture, equitable
antitrust-type remedies, and civil investigative procedures available to the Attorney General. Id. at 18,939.
117. Id. at 18,940. Senator McClellan continued:
The listed offenses lend themselves to organized commercial exploitation...
and experience has shown they are commonly committed by participants in
organized crime. That is all the [Tlitle IX list of offenses purports to be, that
is all the Senate report claims it to be, and that is all it should be.
Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. House Hearings,supra note 103, at 520.
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in the anti-trust laws.... [T]hose who have been wronged by organized
crime," Representative Steiger told the Committee without elaboration,
"should at least be given access to a legal remedy."' 122 On July 21, 1970,

RICO's treble-damages remedy won the endorsement of Senator McClellan, who stated (also without elaboration) that the remedy "should
prove ... to be a major new tool in extirpating the baneful influence of
23
organized crime in our economic life.'
On September 30, the Judiciary Committee favorably reported Senate
Bill 30 with the ultimately enacted private treble-damages remedy in Title
IX.124 The Committee report devoted only two sentences to the newly
inserted private remedy.' 25 In a fifteen-page dissenting statement oppos-

ing Senate Bill 30, three Judiciary Committee members devoted only a

scant paragraph specifically to the private remedy. 126

On October 2, the ACLU urged House members to oppose Senate Bill
30. The ACLU's letter warned that RICO would authorize the Attorney
General to issue civil investigative demands which would "enable the

government to engage in vast 'fishing expeditions"' in support of its criminal and civil remedies. 127 The letter did not mention the private civil
RICO remedy that the House Committee had reported a few days
earlier.

When he summarized Senate Bill 30 on the floor on October 7, Representative Poff, the bill's House sponsor, described RICO's treble-dam-

ages remedy as "another example of the antitrust remedy being adapted
for use against organized criminality."'1 2 8 House debate on the bill then

echoed the earlier Senate debate. House members favorably cited the
Katzenbach Commission report's findings and recommendations concerning organized crime and racketeering.' 29 Like their Senate counter122. Id.
123. 116 CONG. REc. at 25,190 (remarks of Sen. McClellan). 'Two days later, the President-elect of the American Bar Association testified before the House Committee in favor
of a private treble-damages cause of action. House Hearings, supra note 103, at 543-44,
548, 559 (statement of Edward L. Wright).
124. See H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 58, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4007. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (discussed infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text).
125. H.R. REP. No. 1549, supra note 124, reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4007, 4010,
4034.
126. Id. at 187, reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4007, 4083 (dissenting views of Reps.
Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan).
127. 116 CONG. REc. at 35,213 (remarks of Rep. Bingham) (inserting into the record
the letter of Lawrence Speiser, director, ACLU, Washington office).
128. Id. at 35,295 (remarks of Rep. Poff).
129. See, e.g., id. at 35,192 (remarks of Rep. Poff); id. at 35,199 (remarks of Rep.
Rodino); id. at 35,215 (remarks of Rep. Halpern); id. at 35,303 (remarks of Rep. Railsback); id. at 35,319 (remarks of Rep. Roth); id. at 35,320 (remarks of Rep. Price). Supporters and opponents alike saw organized crime and racketeering as one indicator of an
incipient national breakdown of law and order. See, e.g., id. at 35,195 (remarks of Rep.
Celler) ("We must care not only for law and order but for justice as well."); id. at 35,205
(remarks of Rep. Mikva) (OCCA will not "deter street crime, about which people are up
so tight."); id. at 35,205-06 (remarks of Rep. Clancy) ("[C]rime and violence, both in the
streets and on our campuses, are .. threatening our heritage, our traditions .... "); id. at
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Senate
members pinpointed
parts had done a few months earlier, House
' 32
131
130
"mobsters,"'
"the Mafia,"
Bill 30's targets: "the Cosa Nostra,"'
33 "gangsters,"' 34 "the underworld,' ' 35 "crime families,"'1 36
"the mob,'
and "syndicates.' 1 37 Like their counterparts, House members stressed
the involvement of the bill's targets in gambling, drug trafficking, prosti-

tution, extortion, arson, terrorism, loan-sharking, and bootlegging. 138 A
35,206 (remarks of Rep. Kleppe) ("America's internal enemies today are the criminals, the
lawbreakers .... ); id. at 35,214 (remarks of Rep. Alexander) ("[N]o other national concern preys upon the minds of decent, law-abiding citizens more than the consistent and
inexcusable rise in criminal activities in this Nation."); id. at 35,299 (remarks of Rep.
Mayne) (discussing need "to maintain law, order, and decency in this Nation"); id. at
35,305 (remarks of Rep. Hogan) ("much of our street crime is directly linked to organized
crime"); id. at 35,306 (remarks of Rep. Scheuer) (people "want ... some security in the
streets, security in their homes"); id. at 35,309 (remarks of Rep. Mizell) ("the restoration of
law and order is not just a catch phrase in an election year"); id. at 35,313 (remarks of Rep.
Minish) ("[Clrime is on the increase and ... we must act before it is too late to stem this
lawlessness."); id. at 35,314 (remarks of Rep. Ruth) (discussing "our commitment to law
and order in America"); id. at 35,319 (remarks of Rep. Anderson) (OCCA is "an answer to
the crime wave that has been sweeping the Nation."); id. (remarks of Rep. Monagan)
(OCCA is "another link in the chain of legislation we are forging to deal with the menace
of crime in this country."); id. at 35,328 (remarks of Rep. Meskill) ("[T]he citizens of this
land are afraid to walk the city streets at night."); id. at 35,355 (remarks of Rep. Arends)
("Our free society of God-fearing, law abiding people is fast becoming a lawless society.").
130. See, e.g., id. at 35,312 (remarks of Rep. Fountain) ("the hoodlums of the Mafia or
La Cosa Nostra"); id. at 35,312 (remarks of Rep. Brock); id. at 35,309 (remarks of Rep.
Brotzman) ("[O]rganized crime's chain of command is closely guarded, and all too often
only minor functionaries in the ladder ... can be apprehended.").
131. See, e.g., id. at 35,215 (remarks of Rep. Bennett); id. at 35,311 (remarks of Rep.
Fountain); id. at 35,312 (remarks of Rep. Brock).
132. See, e.g., id. at 35,309 (remarks of Rep. Brotzman) ("fat-cat mobsters"); id. at
35,311 (remarks of Rep. Fountain); id. (remarks of Rep. Broomfield); id. at 35,321 (remarks of Rep. Price); id. at 35,321 (remarks of Rep. Stratton).
133. See, e.g., id. at 35,311 (remarks of Rep. Broomfield).
134. See, e.g., id. (remarks of Rep. Fountain); id. (remarks of Rep. Broomfield).
135. See, e.g., id. at 602 (remarks of Sen. Hruska).
136. See, e.g., id. at 35,200 (remarks of Rep. St Germain); id. at 35,328 (remarks of Rep.
Meskill); id. at 35,309 (remarks of Rep. Mizell) ("lords of organized crime").
137. See, e.g., id. at 35,201 (remarks of Rep. Poff); id. at 35,205 (remarks of Rep.
Mikva); id. at 35,215 (remarks of Rep. Fascell); id. at 35,290 (remarks of Rep. Poff); id. at
35,305 (remarks of Rep. Hogan); id. at 35,307 (remarks of Rep. Scheuer); id. at 35,309
(remarks of Rep. Brotzman); id. (remarks of Rep. Minshall); id. at 35,312 (remarks of Rep.
Udall); id. (remarks of Rep. Brock); id. at 35,319 (remarks of Rep. Roth); id. at 35,326
(remarks of Rep. Vanik); id. at 35,327 (remarks of Rep. Randall); id. at 35,328 (remarks of
Rep. Meskill); id. at 35,361 (remarks of Rep. Pepper); id. at 36,296 (remarks of Sen. Dole).
138. See, e.g., id. at 35,199 (remarks of Rep. St Germain) (gambling, usury, and drugs);
id. at 35,201 (remarks of Rep. Poff); id. at 35,206 (remarks of Rep. Kleppe) (gambling,
usury, prostitution, drugs, extortion, terrorism, and arson); id. at 35,215 (remarks of Rep.
Fascell); id. at 35,215 (remarks of Rep. Halpern) ("Gambling is the lifeblood of organized
crime."); id. at 35,216 (remarks of Rep. McDade) (gambling, loan-sharking, and drugs); id.
(remarks of Rep. Donohue) (gambling, loan-sharking, theft and fencing of property, and
drugs); id. at 35,300 (remarks of Rep. Mayne) (gambling, usury, drugs pornography, prostitution, terrorism, and arson); id. at 35,303 (remarks of Rep. Railsback); id. at 35,305 (remarks of Rep. Hogan) (gambling, loan-sharking, numbers racket, and drugs); id. at 35,307
(remarks of Rep. Scheuer) (gambling, loan-sharking, and narcotics); id. at 35,309 (remarks
of Rep.Brotzman) (gambling and drugs); id. at 35,311 (remarks of Rep. Broomfield)
(drugs, loan-sharking, gambling, and prostitution); id. at 35,312 (remarks of Rep. Brock)
(gambling, loan-sharking, drugs, and prostitution); id. at 35,319 (remarks of Rep. Anderson) (gambling, loan-sharking, and drugs); id. at 35,321 (remarks of Rep. Price) (gambling,
drugs, and loan-sharking); id. (remarks of Rep. Bush); id. at 35,326 (remarks of Rep.
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House member proposed an amendment that would have defined the
term "Mafia," or "La Cosa Nostra organization," and would have
criminalized membership. 139 Without questioning the appropriateness of
the label, the House rejected the amendment after other members
ques140
tioned the constitutionality of status-based crime legislation.

The House overwhelmingly passed Senate Bill 30, with minor amendments, on October 7.141 The bill contained the private treble-damage

provision in the form recommended by the Judiciary Committee. 142

Time was growing short. With the congressional session about to end

and national elections less than a month away, the Senate did not seek a
conference, an unusual decision when considering such significant omni-

bus legislation. On October 12, the upper chamber adopted the bill
passed by the House and sent it to President Nixon, who had strongly

supported
it as an essential element of his program to restore law and
143

order.
Three days later, the President signed the OCCA in the Great Hall at
the Department of Justice Building. The legislation, he told the assemblage, would provide federal law enforcement authorities the legal tools
to "launch a total war against organized crime" and strike at its "support
of the drug traffic in this country."'"
Vanik) (gambling, loan-sharking, and drugs); id. at 35,328 (remarks of Rep. Meskill)
(drugs, gambling, and usury).
139. Id. at 35,343 (remarks of Rep. Biaggi).
140. Id. at 35,343-46.
141. Id. at 35,363-64. The House passed the OCCA by a 341-26 vote (63 not voting).
Id. at 35,363.
142. Id. at 35,341.
143. Id. at 36,296. See also Special Message to Congress on the Administration's Legislative Program, PUB. PAPERS 719, 728 (Sept. 11, 1970) (discussing proposed anticrime legislation, including the OCCA). "[T]here is no greater need in this free society than the
restoration of the individual American's freedom from violence in his home and on the
streets of his city or town." Id.
144. President Nixon's Remarks, supra note 8, at 846. The OCCA's stated purpose was
to "seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States... by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23
(1970) (Statement of Findings and Purpose). The Statement provided:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and illegal use
of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion
of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan-sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other
forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used
to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert
and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the
United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm
innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens;
and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally
admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or reme-
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"THE CIVIL RICO LITIGATION EXPLOSION": "[S]OMETHING
QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THE ORIGINAL CONCEPTION OF
1 45
ITS ENACTORS'

Senator McClellan, Representative Poff, and their colleagues advanced
civil RICO confident that Congress was enacting a private remedy
against organized crime and racketeering. But things did not turn out
quite as anticipated.
146
Civil RICO went virtually unnoticed for most of its first decade,
largely because RICO is codified in Title 18 of the United States Code
(the "Crimes and Criminal Procedure" title), whose pages plaintiffs' lawyers ordinarily do not consult in search of private remedies. 147 Only two
reported opinions had considered civil RICO claims by 1978 and only

thirteen by early 1981.148
By late 1981, however, plaintiffs began to discover not only civil
RICO's existence, but also its potential as a general federal antifraud
remedy. 14 9 The discovery has been variously attributed to a 1980 law review article that demonstrated civil RICO's breadth 150 and to the movement into private law practice of federal prosecutors who had grown
151
familiar with RICO's criminal remedy during the 1970s.
In 1983, the American Bar Association's Litigation Section published a
two-volume set of seminar materials entitled RICO: The Ultimate
Weapon in Business and Commercial Litigation.'52 A year later, a lawyer

suggested that to omit a civil RICO claim in a private securities complaint
dies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime
and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are
unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
Id. (the Statement of Findings and Purpose was reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 historical
notes (1994)). RICO's purpose was to "eliminat[e] ...the infiltration of organized crime
and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce." SENATE
REPORT, supra note 10, at 76.

145. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985).
146. See, e.g., id. at 481 (discussing civil RICO's "initial dormancy").
147. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995).
148. See Louis C. Long, Treble Damagesfor Violations of the FederalSecurities Laws: A
Suggested Analysis and Application of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REV.
201, 206 n.32 (1981) (citing decisions).
149. Of the approximately 270 pre-1985 district court civil RICO decisions, 3% were
decided throughout the 1970s, 2% were decided in 1980, 7% in 1981, 13% in 1982, 33% in
1983, and 43% in 1984. See REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE
ABA SECTION OF CORP., BANKING & BUSINESS LAW 55 (1985) [hereinafter ABA
REPORT].

150. G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminaland Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1037-48
(1980).
151. See, e.g., Robert Kessler, RICO Law's Unexpected Result, NEWSDAY, Jan. 7, 1985,
at 7, col. 1, 17, col. 2.
152. RICO: The Ultimate Weapon in Business and Commercial Litigation, A.B.A. SEC.
LIG.(1983). See also Barry Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291,304 (1983) (civil
RICO "could federalize all torts involving business transactions").
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was "virtually malpractice."'1 53 In 1984, a district judge stated that if civil
RICO were given its broadest reading, the statute "would literally make a
federal case out of nearly every instance of business fraud. ' 154 A Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission reported that civil
RICO had "turned virtually every securities fraud claim into a potential
RICO claim," and that "RICO claims coupled with securities fraud

claims seem to have become the rule rather than the exception."'1 55 In
early 1985, another district judge asked rhetorically: "Would 156any self-

respecting plaintiffs' lawyer omit a RICO charge these days?"'
The Supreme Court first addressed civil RICO in 1985 in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.1 57 Writing for the Court, Justice Byron R. White

raised few eyebrows when he observed that the private remedy was
"evolving into something quite different from the original conception of
its enactors."'1 58 Of the 270 known district court civil RICO decisions
reported before 1985, forty percent involved securities fraud and thirtyseven percent involved common law fraud in a commercial or business
153. Absence of RICO Claim in Securities Suits Termed "Malpractice"By Attorney, 16
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 754 (May 4,1984) (remarks of Jerold S. Solovy). See
also Judah Best et al., The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct: Hardly a
Civil Statute, in RICO: EXPANDING USES IN CIVIL LITIGATION 7 (1984) ("Under the law
today, it would be a poor attorney who overlooked the possibility of RICO relief."); Donald J.Moran, Pleading a Civil RICO Action Under Section 1962(c): Conflicting Precedent
and the Practitioner'sDilemma, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 731, 735 (1984) (stating that counsel risks
malpractice suit by omitting any civil RICO claims in an ordinary fraud action).
154. Bruns v. Ledbetter, 583 F. Supp. 1050, 1055 (S.D. Cal. 1984). See also Schacht v.
Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1361 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983) (calling RICO a
"perhaps insufficiently discriminate tool for combating organized crime"; Congress "may
well have created a runaway treble damage bonanza for the already excessively litigious");
Flinders v. Datasec Corp., 742 F. Supp. 929, 936 n.12 (E.D. Va. 1990) ("[R]easonable persons might well doubt whether civil RICO was adequately considered before passage and
whether it is playing a socially useful role in the administration of civil justice, given the
substantial time and resources devoted to solving its puzzles."); PMC, Inc. v. Ferro Corp.,
131 F.R.D. 184, 187 (C.D. Cal. 1990) ("[Tjhis court is legitimately concerned about the
misuse of civil RICO and the increasingly familiar phenomenon of expanding a straightforward breach of contract into p claim of promissory fraud."); MacPeg Ross O'Connell &
Goldhaber, Inc. v. Castello, 686 F. Supp. 397, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (discussing "the increasingly obligatory RICO count"); Plount v. American Home Assur. Co., 668 F. Supp. 204,
205 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[Clivil RICO has resulted in a flood of what are and should be state
court cases that are being reframed and brought in federal court ... because of the carrot
of treble recovery and the availability of a federal forum."); Bear Creek Prods., Inc. v.
Saleh, 643 F. Supp. 489, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (discussing the "seemingly inevitable civil
RICO claim now commonly appended in actions sounding in contract and fraud"); Horsell
1986)
Graphic Indus., Ltd. v. Valuation Counselors, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1117, 1124 (N.D. I11.
(discussing "the obligatory RICO counts").
155. Senate Panel Hears Suggestionsfor Amending Civil RICO Provisions, 17 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA), No. 21, at 924, 925 (May 24, 1985) (quoting Comm'r Charles L.
Marinaccio).
1985). See also Mikva,
156. Papagiannis v. Pontikis, 108 F.R.D. 177, 179 n.1 (N.D. I11.
NAM Tell House Panel of Need for RICO Prior Conviction Requirement, 17 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1837 (Oct. 18, 1985) (quoting U.S. Circuit Judge Abner J. Mikva:
"The civil RICO count is today almost boilerplate in commercial lawsuits.").
157. 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985) (civil RICO does not limit defendant class to persons
previously convicted under RICO or a predicate act, or plaintiff class to persons who can
establish a "racketeering injury").
158. Id. at 500.
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setting. 159 Only nine percent of these decisions involved "allegations of
criminal activity of a type generally associated with professional
criminals," such as arson, bribery, commercial bribery, embezzlement, ex-

tortion, gambling, theft, and political corruption. 160 No private plaintiff,
however, apparently had ever filed a civil RICO action against a member
16 1
of an organized crime family.
As the number of federal civil RICO filings grew considerably during
the second half of the 1980s, 162 some courts took the unusual step of publicly urging Congress to amend civil RICO to restrict its reach. 63 Off the
bench, Chief Justice Rehnquist urged Congress to amend civil RICO "to
limit its scope to the sort of wrongs that are connected to organized

crime, or have some other reason for being in federal court."' 164 Invita65

tions such as these went unaccepted.1

From the vantage afforded by the mid-1990s, it is evident that even civil
RICO's 1970 congressional opponents underestimated the private remedy's expansive reach. Despite their prescience, opponents did not artic-

ulate the fundamentally differing roles private plaintiffs and the
government would play in the operation of RICO remedies dependent on

proof of expansive congruent elements. In their terse dissenting statement in the House Judiciary Committee report preceding floor debate on
RICO, for example, Representative Abner J. Mikva and two colleagues
went no further than to predict that civil RICO would invite "disgruntled
and malicious competitors to harass innocent businessmen.' 1 66 The statement's hypothetical did not foresee that civil RICO would move well be159. See ABA REPORT, supra note 149, at 55. The Task Force estimated that the 270
decisions "[did] not come close to representing the total universe of RICO claims brought
in federal court." Id. at 30. According to another survey of 132 published civil RICO
decisions, 57 involved securities transactions and 38 involved commercial and contract disputes; no other category hit double figures. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 n.16 (1985) (discussing American Institute of Certified Public Accounts, The Authority to Bring Private
Treble-Damage Suits Under "RICO" Should Be Removed 13 (Oct. 10, 1984)).
160. See ABA REPORT, supra note 149, at 55.
161. See, e.g., Reform of the Private Civil Action Provisionof RICO, 41 REc. N.Y. CITY
B.A. (Comm. on Fed. Legislation), May 1986, at 415.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 265-66.
163. See, e.g., Illinois Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1985)
(holding that state tax agency may maintain civil RICO action against retailer who filed
fraudulent state sales tax returns; "We can only hope that this decision appears to Congress
as the distress flag that it is, and that Congress will act to limit ... the statute's application .. "); Hall Am. Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Dick, 726 F. Supp. 1083, 1088 n.10
(E.D. Mich. 1989).
164. William H. Rehnquist, Get RICO Cases Out of My Courtroom, WALL ST. J., May
19, 1989, at A14 (excerpt from Chief Justice Rehnquist's speech at the Eleventh Seminar
on the Administration of Justice sponsored by the Brookings Institute on Apr. 7, 1989),
reprinted in Remarks of the ChiefJustice, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 5, 13 (1989); see also David B.
Sentelle, Civil RICO: The Judges' Perspective,and Some Notes on Practicefor North Carolina Lawyers, 12 CAMPBELL L. REv. 145, 148 (1990) ("[E]very single district judge with
whom I have discussed the subject (and I'm talking in the dozens of district judges from
across the country) echoes the entreaty expressed in the Chief Justice's title in the Wall
Street Journal.").
165. See infra note 368 and accompanying text.
166. 116 CONG. REc. 36,342 (remarks of Rep. Mikva).

54

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

yond mere harassment, and mere use by competitors, to become a
general federal antifraud remedy: "A competitor need only claim that his
rival has derived gains from two games of poker, and, because [RICO]
1 67
prohibits even the 'indirect' use of such gains ... litigation is begun."'

Few, if any, civil RICO claims have ever been grounded in illicit
gambling.

The Supreme Court's nine civil RICO decisions demonstrate that the
evolution of the private remedy bears no resemblance to the intent of
Congress or the President in 1970. Sedima, the Court's first civil RICO
decision, was a joint venturer's suit alleging that the defendant corporation had submitted inflated bills, and thus had cheated the plaintiff out of
proceeds due under the parties' joint venture agreement. 168 In American
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc.,169 Sedima's companion case,
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant bank and several of its officers
had fraudulently charged excessive interest rates on loans. The essence
of the Haroco claim was that the plaintiffs were overcharged when the
170
bank lied about its prime rate.
In 1987, Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon 17' demonstrated

civil RICO's ready application to securities fraud litigation. The plaintiff
securities customers alleged that a Shearson registered representative had
engaged in fraudulent, excessive trading on the plaintiffs' accounts, had
made false statements, and had omitted material facts from the advice she
gave the plaintiffs.' 72 In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & AsSOCS.,173 decided two weeks later, the plaintiff insurance agent alleged
its
that the defendant insurance company had wrongfully terminated
74
quota.
production
a
meet
to
failed
agency after the agent
167. Id. Representative Mikva was Senate Bill 30's most vocal opponent during the
floor debate. Focusing on gambling, he hypothesized that RICO's private remedy would
be "a dangerous tool.., to a competitor who wants to go after somebody who is competing too vigorously against [the competitor]":
[The competitor] can show, for example, that his competition won some
money gambling in Las Vegas and took the money and put it into an interstate business. If in the State in which he is engaged in an interstate business,
gambling is in violation of the law, then that man is guilty of racketeering....
A]ny competitor may go in and seek threefold damages, which means that
he can literally drive his competitor out of business.
Id. See also id. at 35,205 (remarks of Rep. Mikva) (OCCA bill "will subject the courts, the
prosecutors and indeed every person who studies the law to incredible burdens and
problems in trying to decipher, administer, and uphold some of the provisions that we are
about to enact.").
168. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 483-84.
169. 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
170. Id. at 607 (rejecting argument that civil RICO plaintiffs injury must flow not from
the predicate acts themselves but from the fact that they were preformed as part of the
conduct of an enterprise).
171. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
172. Id. at 223 (holding that predispute arbitration agreements, otherwise enforceable
in accordance with the terms of the Federal Arbitration Act, apply to civil RICO claims).
173. 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
174. Id. at 145 (holding that four-year statute of limitations applicable to Clayton Act
civil enforcement actions applies in civil RICO actions).
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H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,175 decided in 1989, was a
suit by customers who alleged that the defendant telephone company and
several of its individual agents had sought to improperly influence state
public utilities commission members in the performance of their duties.
The customers alleged they were injured when the commission approved
rates for the company in excess of a fair and reasonable amount. The
defendants allegedly had made cash payments to commissioners, had nethe
gotiated with them regarding future employment, and had paid17for
6
commissioners' parties, meals, and other personal expenditures.
In Tafflin v. Levitt,1 77 decided in 1990, holders of unpaid certificates of
deposit alleged fraud in connection with a savings and loan association's
79
failure. 17 8 In Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp. (SIPC),'
decided in 1992, SIPC alleged that the defendant had conspired in a
stock-manipulation scheme that disabled two broker-dealers from meeting obligations to customers and thus triggered SIPC's statutory duty 18to1
8 0 Reves v. Ernst & Young,
advance funds to reimburse the customers.'
decided a year later, involved a bankruptcy trustee's suit against a major
accounting firm that had engaged in various activities relating to valuation of a gasohol plant on a farming cooperative's yearly audits and financial statements. After the cooperative filed for bankruptcy, the trustee
alleged that the activities rendered the accounting firm liable under civil
RICO to holders of some of the cooperative's notes. 182
National Organizationfor Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,'83 the Court's latest civil RICO decision, arose from a dispute entirely outside the business
and commercial arena. The plaintiff health care clinics alleged that the
defendants, a coalition of anti-abortion groups, were members of a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through a pattern of
could recover
racketeering activity. 184 The Court held that the plaintiffs
185
under civil RICO if they proved their allegations.
Civil RICO has become an errant remedy primarily because its expansive elements invite broad private application, which Congress failed to
175. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
176. Id. at 233 (interpreting RICO pattern requirement).
177. 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
178. Id. at 457 (holding that state courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction
over claims arising under civil RICO).
179. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
180. Id. at 262 (to recover under civil RICO, plaintiff must prove that the RICO violation was the proximate cause of its injury).
181. 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
182. Id. at 172-75 (to recover for violation of §1962(c) of RICO, plaintiff must allege
and prove that the defendant "participate[d] in the operation or management of the enterprise itself").
183. 510 U.S. 249 (1994) (RICO does not require allegation or proof that the enterprise
or the predicate acts were motivated by an economic purpose). See also id. at 263 (Souter,
J., concurring) (plaintiffs may raise First Amendment challenges to RICO's application in
particular cases).
184. The pattern consisted of alleged acts of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1951 (1994); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1).
185. Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 263.
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anticipate when it legislated amid the tumult of the 1970 election campaign. 186 To state a civil RICO claim, the plaintiff must allege that it suffered (1) injury in its business or property because the defendant, (2)
while involved in one or more enumerated relationships with an "enterprise," (3) engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity."'1 87 As the next
Part demonstrates, a defendant does not have to be an organized crime
member or racketeer to qualify.
III.

CIVIL RICO'S BREADTH AND COMPLEXITY

A. CIVIL RICO's

BREADTH:

"ANY PERSON INJURED IN HIS BUSINESS

OR PROPERTY"

1.

Injury

Until Congress passed the 1995 Securities Litigation Reform Act,
§ 1964(c) of RICO provided that "[a]ny person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 ...may sue therefor in

any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold
the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable

attorney's fee."'188 The 1995 Act amended § 1964(c) by creating an exception for securities suits only: "[N]o person may rely upon any conduct
that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of secur-

ities to establish a violation of section 1962," unless the defendant "is
criminally convicted in connection with the fraud.' 189
By providing that "'person' includes any individual or entity capable of
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property," RICO creates a broad
class of potential plaintiffs.19° Virtually all civil RICO claims have been
asserted by plaintiffs who allege no injury at the hands of anyone con186. Broad application of civil RICO may frequently be encouraged by RICO's uncodifled liberal-construction clause: "The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes." Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
187. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
The first element is unique to civil RICO, and the second and third elements are common
to civil RICO and the government's criminal and civil remedies.
RICO also operates against persons who engage in "collection of an unlawful debt"
without necessarily having engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
See, e.g., United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 563 n.12 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
925 (1991) (criminal RICO decision; proof of collection of an unlawful debt does not require a showing that the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity). According to the Senate report, Congress intended the "unlawful debt" concept to operate only in
"cases of clear 'loan-sharking."' See Senate Report, supra note 10, at 158-59; see also id. at
78-80; H.R. REP. No. 1574, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970). RICO's definition of "unlawful
debt" relates generally to activities involving usury and illegal gambling. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(6). Because these activities are not staples of civil RICO suits, the overwhelming
majority of civil RICO claims are grounded in allegations of a pattern.
188. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 107, 109 Stat. 737, 758.
189. Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 107, 109 Stat. 737, 758. In such an action, civil RICO's fouryear statute of limitations begins to run on the date on which the conviction becomes final.
Id. The amendment does not affect or apply to any private action arising under Title I of
the Securities Act of 1933 or Title I of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, commenced
before and pending on the date of the amendment's enactment. Id. § 108.

190. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3).
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nected with organized crime or racketeering. These civil RICO plaintiffs

have included individuals, 191 American and foreign corporations, 192 partnerships, 93 governmental units and agencies, 94 labor unions, 95
churches, 196 universities, 97 estates, 198 and foreign governments. 99

Before the Supreme Court's 1985 Sedima decision, 2°° many lower
courts sought to restrict civil RICO's breadth by holding that § 1964(c)
conferred standing only on persons who alleged particular types of injury
to their business or property. 201 Because RICO was conceived as antiracketeering legislation, for example, some courts required allegation of

"racketeering injury," which the Second Circuit described as "injury
caused by an activity which RICO was designed to deter. ' '20 2 Racketeer-

ing injury presumably required proof of some organized-crime involvement by the defendant.
Sedima struck down the racketeering-injury requirement as the prod-

uct of "statutory amendment [not] appropriately undertaken by the
courts. ' 20 3 The Court reached the sensible holding that § 1964(c) plainly
does not limit the nature of the proprietary injury the plaintiff must

allege. 204

191. See, e.g., Cowan v. Corley, 814 F.2d 223, 226-27 (5th Cir. 1987).
192. See, e.g, Brink's Mat Ltd. v. Diamond, 906 F.2d 1519, 1521 (11th Cir. 1990) (English corporation); Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1987) (American corporation); Thai Airways Int'l Ltd. v. United Aviation Leasing B.V., 842 F. Supp.
1567, 1569 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (Thai corporation).
193. See, e.g., Manax v. McNamara, 842 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1988); Meadow Ltd. Partnership v. Heritage Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Va. 1986).
194. See, e.g., Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136 (9th
Cir. 1991); Town of W. Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1990); County
of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 866 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1003
(1990); City of N.Y. v. JAM Consultants, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
195. See, e.g., Butchers Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535 (9th Cir.
1986); International Bd. of Elec. Workers, Local 340 v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n,
No. Civ. S-86-881, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10634 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 1990).
196. See, e.g., Religious Technology Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103 (1987).
197. See, e.g., University of Md. at Baltimore v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265
(3d Cir. 1991); Temple Univ. v. Salla Bros., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
198. See, e.g., Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 160 (7th Cir. 1994); Estate of Dearing v.
Dearing, 646 F. Supp. 903 (S.D. W. Va. 1986).
199. See, e.g., Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1988)
(en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989); Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 797 F.
Supp. 64, 66-68 (D. Mass. 1992); Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
714 F. Supp. 1362, 1373 (D.N.J. 1989).
200. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
201. See, e.g., Douglas E. Abrams, The Place of ProceduralControl in Determining
Who May Sue or Be Sued: Lessons in Statutory Interpretationfrom Civil RICO and
Sedima, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1477, 1509-16 (1985) (citing decisions).
202. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482,494 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479
(1985).
203. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500 (noting that § 1964(c)'s language closely tracks that of § 4
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994), and as a result some lower courts had required
civil RICO plaintiffs to allege an "antitrust-type" injury, one that placed them at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace). See Abrams, supra note 201, at 1511-13 (citing
decisions). The Supreme Court's Sedima decision also rejected this requirement. Sedima,
473 U.S. at 497 n.15.
204. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495-97.
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2. Enterprise

For its part, § 1962 makes it unlawful for "any person" to engage in a
pattern of racketeering activity while the person is involved in one or

more of four enumerated relationships with an "enterprise.

' 20 5

RICO's

broad inclusive definition of "person" delimits the potential defendant

class.20 6 In actions having nothing to do with organized crime or racketeering, civil RICO defendants have included individuals,20 7 American
and foreign corporations, 20 8 business partnerships, 20 9 labor unions,2 10 re-

ceivers, 211 churches, 2 12 colleges and universities, 2 13 accounting firms, 2 14
lawyers and law firms, 215 estates, 216 public utilities,2 17 and political party
2 18
organizations.
Before Sedima, some district courts sought to restrict civil RICO's
breadth by holding that although § 1962 operates against "any person,"
the section could be violated only by persons connected with organized
crime. 2 19 Even before Sedima, however, the organized-crime limit on
civil RICO's defendant class was rejected by all courts of appeals and
205. The enterprise must be one "which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). Under the contemporary conception of Congress's commerce power, this requirement has not been a significant impediment to civil RICO suits. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995). See
also United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995) (striking down Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990 for exceeding Congress's commerce power), discussed infra note 411 and accompanying text. See generally ABRAMS, supra note 5, § 4.4.
206. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3).
207. See, e.g., Cowan v. Corley, 814 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1987).
208. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987)
(Canadian corporation); Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1005
(1991) (Netherlands corporation); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1987)
(U.S. corporation); United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980)
(U.S. corporation and Japanese corporation).
209. See, e.g.,
Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines, and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990);
In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1989); Fahrenz v. Meadow Farm
Partnership, 850 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1988).
210. See, e.g., Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386 (11th Cir.),
modified per curiam on other grounds, 30 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
900 (1995); Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 817 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1987);
Johnston Dev. Group, Inc. v. Carpenters Local Union No. 1578, 728 F. Supp. 1142, 1146
(D.N.J. 1990).
211. See, e.g., In re S. Indus. Banking Corp., 872 F.2d 1257 (6th Cir. 1989).
212. See, e.g., Religious Technology Ctr. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1989); Religious Technology Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1103 (1987); Miceli v. Stromer, 675 F. Supp. 1559 (D. Colo. 1987).
213. See, e.g., O'Malley v. O'Neill, 887 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S.
926 (1990); Robinson v.City Colleges, 656 F. Supp. 555 (N.D. Il1. 1987).
214. See, e.g., Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1988).
215. See, e.g., Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, 869 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd sub
nom. Tribune Co. v. Abiola, 66 F.3d 12 (2d Cir. 1995).
216. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673 (N.D.
Ind. 1982).
217. See, e.g., County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir.
1990).
218. See, e.g., Jund v. Town of Hempstead, 941 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir. 1991); Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987).
219. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 201, at 1516-19, 1521-24 (citing decisions).
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most district courts that had considered

it.220

Sedima and H.J. laid the organized-crime limit to rest. Sedima acknowledged that civil RICO actions "are being brought almost solely
against [nonracketeer] defendants, rather than against the archetypal, intimidating mobster. '221 The Court held, however, that civil RICO's use
against nonracketeers is "inherent in the statute as written" 222 because
§ 1962 operates broadly against "'any person'-not just mobsters. ' 223
H.J. later rejected the contention that RICO's pattern element requires
proof of activity "characteristic either of organized crime in the traditional sense, or of an organized-crime-type perpetrator, that is, of an association dedicated to the repeated commission of criminal offenses. ' 224

RICO provides that the term "'enterprise' includes any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union
or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. '225
Virtually all civil RICO claims have named enterprises that have nothing
to do with organized crime or racketeering. Civil RICO private-entity
enterprises have included individuals, 226 partnerships, 227 joint ventures, 228 sole proprietorships, 229 corporations, 230 professional corporations, 23 ' law firms, 232 cooperatives, 233 universities, 234 estates, 2 35 savings
and loan associations, 236 accounting firms, 237 profit sharing plans,238 pen220. See id. at 1516 & nn.193-95 (citing decisions).
221. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 495.
224. H.J., 492 U.S. at 243-44.
225. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
226. See, e.g., Flournoy v. Peyson, 701 F. Supp. 1370, 1381-82 (N.D. II. 1988); Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 634 F. Supp. 1284, 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
227. See, e.g., Beauford v. Helmsley, 865 F.2d 1386, 1391 (2d Cir. 1989) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 492 U.S. 914 (1989).
228. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 483-84, and Amended Complaint 9 58, reprintedin
Joint Appendix 18a; Medallion Television Enters., Inc. v. SelecTV of Cal., Inc., 833 F.2d
1360, 1362 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 917 (1989); Battlefield Builders, Inc. v.
Swango, 743 F.2d 1060, 1064 (4th Cir. 1984).
229. See, e.g., McCullough v. Suter, 757 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1985).
230. See, e.g., John C. Holland Enters., Inc. v. J.P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc., 653 F. Supp.
1242, 1249 (E.D. Va.), affd, 829 F.2d 1120 (4th Cir. 1987).
231. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rosenfield, 683 F. Supp. 106, 109 (E.D. Pa.
1988).
232. See, e.g., Park S. Assocs. v. Fischbein, 626 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 800
F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986).
233. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 172-74 (1993).
234. See, e.g.,
Temple Univ. v. Salla Bros., No. 85-1426, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12099
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1987).
235. See, e.g., Norris v. Wirtz, 703 F. Supp. 1322, 1329 (N.D. Il.1989); Gunther v.
Dinger, 547 F. Supp. 25, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
236. See, e.g., In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 916 F.2d 874, 877 (3d Cir. 1990).
237. See, e.g., Baggio v. EC Solar, Inc., No. 88 C 1893, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5569
(N.D. Ill. May 8, 1990).
238. See, e.g., Schiffels v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 978 F.2d 344, 351 (7th Cir. 1992).
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sion funds, 239 political campaign committees, 240 and trusts. 241 Civil
242
RICO public enterprises have included cities and other municipalities,
municipal and state agencies, 243 publicly operated railroads, 244 and federal district courts. 245 An association-in-fact enterprise consists of the asalso
sociates' acts; in virtually all civil RICO actions, these enterprises
246
have had nothing to do with organized crime and racketeering.
RICO's four enterprise relationships are particularly broad. Most civil
RICO claims have alleged violation of § 1962(c), which makes it unlawful
for any person "employed by or associated with any enterprise ... to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter"247
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.
Until the Supreme Court decided Reves v. Ernst & Young 248 in 1993,
§ 1962(c) claimants in several circuits normally did not have particular
difficulty alleging that a person (unconnected with organized crime or
racketeering) who was employed by or associated with an enterprise (also
unconnected with organized crime or racketeering) had participated, directly or indirectly, in the enterprise's affairs. Defendants in actions
grounded in § 1962(c) included lawyers, accountants, and other professional advisors whose tangential roles established "association with" the
affairs of enterprises unconnected with organized crime or
249
racketeering.
239. See, e.g., Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 30 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir.
1994), modifying per curiam on this ground 17 F.3d 1386, 1398 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 900 (1995).
240. See, e.g., Hindes v. Castle, 937 F.2d 868, 871 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1991).
241. See, e.g., Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1028-29 (7th Cir. 1987); Police Retirement
Sys. v. Midwest Inv. Advisory Servs., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 708, 711 (E.D. Mo. 1989), affd, 940
F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1991) (public pension trust created by statute); Norris, 703 F. Supp. at
1329 (testamentary trust).
242. See, e.g., New Burnham Prairie Homes, Inc. v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474,
1478 (7th Cir. 1990) (village); City of Chicago Heights v. LoBue, 914 F. Supp. 279, 285
(N.D. I1. 1996).
243. See, e.g., HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 828 F.2d 1071, 1073 n.2 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1009 (1988) (county planning department; state department of highways and
transportation); Curiale v. Capolino, 883 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
244. See, e.g., North Star Contracting Corp. v. Long Island R.R., 723 F. Supp. 902, 906
(E.D.N.Y. 1989).
245. See, e.g., Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 809 F.2d 1016, 1018 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 822 (1987).
246. See ABRAMS, supra note 5, § 4.3.1. Like other enterprises, association-in-fact enterprises must demonstrate requisite purpose and continuity; in many circuits, the evidence
offered to prove the enterprise must also be distinct, as a matter of law, from the evidence
offered to prove the pattern of racketeering activity. See id. at § 4.3.2.
247. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Section 1962(a) makes it unlawful for any person "who has
received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity
.*. to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise." Id. § 1962(a). Section 1962(b) makes it unlawful for any person, "through a pattern
of racketeering activity .. to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or
control of any enterprise." Id. § 1962(b). Section 1962(d) makes it "unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of" § 1962(a), (b), or (c). Id. § 1962(d).
248. 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
249. See ABRAMS, supra note 5, at § 4.7.3.
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Reves held that to "conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of [the] enterprise's affairs," the defendant "must have partici-

pated in the operation or management of the enterprise itself. '2 50 Despite this apparently restrictive holding, however, filings of civil RICO
claims alleging violations of § 1962(c) have continued in substantial
251
numbers.
3. Pattern of Racketeering Activity
a. Racketeering Activity

"[T]he heart of any RICO complaint is the allegation of a pattern of
racketeering. '252 Contrary to whatever first impression the name might
leave, a person does not have to be a racketeer to engage in the pattern.

A person engages in "racketeering activity" by committing any of the
more than two dozen so-called "predicate acts" enumerated in RICO. 253
Some of these predicate acts, such as "any act or threat involving murder,
kidnaping, gambling, arson, [or] robbery," 254 might frequently be com-

mitted by the organized crime members and racketeers whom Congress
and the President targeted in 1970. But persons having nothing to do
with organized crime and racketeering routinely commit at least three
other predicate acts listed in RICO: mail fraud, wire fraud, or fraud in
255
the sale of securities.
Most civil RICO claims rely primarily or exclusively on mail fraud or
wire fraud predicates. 256 These two predicates are the "single most signif250. Reves, 507 U.S. at 182.
251. See, e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 5, at § 4.7.3 n.81k (Supp. 1996) (citing decisions).
See also infra text accompanying notes 267-71 (citing figures concerning federal civil RICO
filings).
252. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987) (emphasis in original).
253. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
254. Id.
255. See id. § 1961(1)(b), (d). Section 107 of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 107, 109 Stat. 737, 758 (1995), precludes civil RICO
plaintiffs from alleging fraud in the purchase or sale of securities as a predicate act unless
the defendant is criminally convicted in connection with the fraud. Where the would-be
civil RICO claim is based on conduct that would be actionable as fraud in the purchase or
sale of securities, § 107 also precludes the plaintiff from bringing the claim against unconvicted defendants based on allegations of other predicate acts, such as mail fraud or wire
fraud. See id.
Lower courts remain divided on the question of whether a plaintiff who seeks to base a
civil RICO claim on securities fraud must have purchased or sold a security. See Holmes v.
Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 274-76 (1992) (noting conflict among
circuits but declining to reach the question). The four concurring Justices in Holmes
reached the question and answered in the negative. See id. at 276-86 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 286-90 (Scalia, J., concurring). After the 1995 Act, of course, the question is
relevant only where the defendant is convicted of the alleged securities fraud.
256. See Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 149. See also ABA REPORT, supra note 149, at 57.
Approximately 44[%] of the cases for which the predicate offenses can be
determined from the opinion appear to rely solely on allegations of mail or
wire fraud. Another 13[%] rely primarily on mail or wire fraud, but also
allege another predicate offense. Thwelve percent focus on another predicate
offense, but also allege mail or wire fraud violations. Approximately 35[%]
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icant" reason why civil RICO has become a general federal antifraud

remedy. 257 Under settled law, each fraudulent use of the mails or interstate wires constitutes a separate indictable mail fraud or wire fraud of-

fense, even if multiple uses are made pursuant to a single fraudulent
scheme or artifice. 258 Each fraudulent use thus constitutes a RICO predicate act. 259 Because nearly all business dealings involve some use of the
mails or interstate wires, civil RICO plaintiffs can allege mail fraud or
wire fraud predicates (and, thus, perhaps a pattern of racketeering activity) almost on mere allegation of intentional fraud against defendants
having no connection with organized crime and racketeering.

Also inviting broad application of civil RICO is another category of
predicates: "indictable" Hobbs Act extortion violations and acts or
threats involving extortion chargeable under state law and punishable by

imprisonment for more than one year.260 In suits having nothing to do
with organized crime and racketeering, this category has enabled plaintiffs to join civil RICO claims against nonracketeers that arise from business pressure, labor-management
disputes, and disputes concerning
2 61
public policy matters.

b. Pattern of Racketeering Activity
RICO's pattern definition provides only a floor. A pattern "requires at

least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after [October 15, 1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding
any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.

'262

rely solely or primarily on allegations of securities fraud. No other predicate
offense occurs in as many as [2%] of the cases.
Id.
257. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 501 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
258. See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916); Akin v. Q-L Invs., Inc., 959
F.2d 521, 533 (5th Cir. 1992) (civil RICO action) (citing United States v. McClelland, 868
F.2d 704, 706 (5th Cir. 1989)).
259. Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1130 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated and remanded sub nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914, cert. denied sub nom. Abell v. Wright,
Lindsey & Jennings, 492 U.S. 918 (1989).
260. See The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; id. § 1961.
261. See, e.g., National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 252-53 (1994)
(civil RICO action against antiabortion protesters); Turkish v. Kasenetz, 27 F.3d 23, 27 (2d
Cir. 1994) (civil RICO claim resulting from business pressure); Northeast Women's Ctr.,
Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1347-48 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989) (successful civil RICO action against antiabortion protesters); Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 913 F.2d 948, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(holding that where a union merely conducts a recognition strike against an employer, the
union does not conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the employer's affairs within the meaning of § 1962(c); however, a § 1962(c) action could proceed
against union's business agent-trustee, who allegedly took control of union and caused it to
engage in the predicate acts of extortion), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1222 (1991). See generally
ABRAMS, supra note 5, at § 5.3.5.
262. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
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CIVIL RICO's

COMPLEXITY: "[O]NE OF THE MOST CONFUSING
26 3
CRIMES EVER DEVISED BY" CONGRESS

Only a handful of federal district court filings carried civil RICO claims
throughout the 1970s. 264 In most years since the onset of the "civil RICO
explosion" in the early 1980s, civil RICO filings have represented a relatively modest number of the total civil filings. It was estimated that approximately 100 filings carried civil RICO claims in 1984, and more than
400 in 1986.265 The years 1987 through 1988 saw approximately 1000 civil
RICO filings annually. 266 In the 1991 Annual Report, the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts began according civil
RICO filings a discrete category in the summary of the Judicial Business
of the United States Courts. The number of annual civil RICO district
court filings has diminished somewhat in recent years, but remains near
the high-water mark of the late 1980s. Even without the federal question
subject matter jurisdiction of civil RICO, diversity of citizenship would
have enabled a small percentage of the filings (absent the civil RICO
claims, of course) to be heard and decided in the federal forum:
12-month period ended:
Civil RICO Cases
Federal Question
Diversity
June 30, 1990

1,214267

108268
846
954
June 30, 1991
76269
813
889
Sept. 30, 1992
69270
826
895
Sept. 30, 1993
81271
742
823
Sept. 30, 1994
These numbers, however, obscure the true measure of civil RICO's
ongoing burden on the federal courts. As District of Columbia Circuit
Judge David B. Sentelle wrote in 1990, the burden has emanated not only
from numbers, but also from the judicial time required to resolve civil
RICO's ambiguities and unravel the sheer complexity of attendant fac263. Casey v. Department of State, 980 F.2d 1472, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
264. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
265. Sentelle, supra note 164, at 148; see also Senate Panel Hears Suggestions for
Amending Civil RICO Provisions, supra note 155, at 925 (according to a Justice Department study, reported civil RICO filings in federal court through the end of 1984 constituted less than 1% of the federal courts' total annual civil caseload attributable to private
litigation).
266. Sentelle, supra note 164, at 148. See William H. Rehnquist, supra note 164, at A14;
see also G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster
Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposalsfor Reform: "Mother of God-Is This
the End of RICO"?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 851,878 (1990) (estimating that approximately 2902
federal filings carried civil RICO claims from Dec. 1979 to Jan. 1988).
267. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR 191 (1991).

268. Id.
269. See

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE DIRECTOR 180 (1992).
270. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE DIRECTOR A1-56 (1993).

271. See

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE DIRECTOR A1-57 (1994).
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tual and legal issues. 272
Docket pressures frequently leave federal courts struggling to remain
timely with criminal cases and to calendar civil trials within months or
years.273 Under this circumstance, a meaningful assessment of a cause of
action's effect on the docket transcends numbers and also measures the
judicial time required for disposition, 2 74 Hours are limited and thus precious in judicial chambers, both for the judge and for the clerks (normally
two clerks in the district court and three in the court of appeals). 275
Hours devoted to one case or opinion are hours not devoted to others.
In the reporters and the computerized retrieval systems, hundreds of
lengthy opinions for more than a decade testify to the drain on judicial
time caused by civil RICO's persistent complexity and ambiguities. In a
1992 decision, the District of Columbia Circuit reached the heart of the
matter when it called RICO "one of the most confusing crimes ever devised by" Congress. 276 Courts have characterized civil RICO with such

daunting descriptions as "intricate, '

277

"agonizingly difficult and confus-

272. See Sentelle, supra note 164, at 148 (discussing civil RICO's "amorphous and
seemingly boundless character").
273. See infra note 377 and accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at a United States Sentencing Commission Symposium on "Drugs and Violence in America," (June 18, 1993), in REUTER TRANSCRIPT REP., June 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File (criminal cases
occupy only approximately 15% of the federal docket, but time studies indicate that they
occupy about 48% of a typical federal district judge's time and 80% of the time of some
district judges); Criminal Trials Dominate U.S. District Courts' Workload, THIRD BRANCH,
Dec. 1992, at 5, 5 (in 37 of the 94 federal districts, more than half of the trials related to
criminal cases during the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1992; districts with particularly high percentages of criminal trials were S.D. Cal. (86%), M.D.N.C. (84.8%), D.N.M
(76.4%), D. Ariz. (74.4%), D. Haw. (72.3%), W.D. Tenn. (68%), S.D. Fla, (66%), D. Or.
(64.9%), N.D. Iowa (63.5%), E.D. Wash. (63.5%), D. Idaho (62.3%), and D.N.D.
(62.3%)).
275. See, e.g., Leonard I. Garth, Views From the FederalBench: Past,Present & Future,
47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1361, 1361-63 (1995). Judge Garth sits on the Third Circuit, whose
active members prepared an average of 417 unconsolidated cases for disposition the prior
year. Id. at 1363. From the appellate perspective, Judge Garth explained time constraints
this way:
[If you were to divide the 255 working days which a court of appeals judge
spends in chambers reviewing appeals (I exclude for the moment the holidays, Saturdays, Sundays, late evening and early morning hours . . .), you
would come up with 1.6 cases a day that a court of appeals judge must decide.
Based on a normal eight-hour day, this results in about five hours a case ...
[T]he briefs have to be read, the internal citations have to be examined, and
the issues have to be analyzed. Discussion with law clerks and conferences
with one's colleagues must take place. Oral argument, if scheduled, must be
heard. Hopefully, the judges should give some thought to the ultimate decision, its ramifications, and its place and effect on the circuit's jurisprudence.
Apart from the time taken to travel to the place where arguments are heard
...and the decision is made, an opinion or order must still be drafted, circulated, approved and filed to conclude the exercise.
Id. at 1363-64.
276. Casey, 980 F.2d at 1477.
277. See, e.g., Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 644
(D. Alaska 1982).
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ing, ' '278 and "unusually confusing and convoluted. ' 279 Other courts have
discussed RICO's "amorphous legal standards" 280 and "murky language.",28 1 The Supreme Court has referred to "the complexities of civil
RICO actions. '282 After the federal courts had wrestled with an array of
intractable civil RICO issues for nearly a decade, a district court noted
that "[e]very element of pleading a RICO claim has given rise to a pleth'283
ora of conflicting decisions.
Factual and legal issues alike have produced civil RICO's burden on
the courts. Civil RICO's character as a dual-level cause of action has
helped to generate particularly intricate issues on dispositive motions, at
trial and on appeal. At one level, plaintiffs must allege and prove their
injuries with requisite causation and the defendant's engagement in a
proscribed enterprise relationship. At the other level, civil RICO also
requires plaintiffs to allege and prove that for at least several months and
usually for a year or more, the defendant violated one or more distinct
predicate statutes with sufficient frequency to establish a pattern of rack284
eteering activity.
Allegation and proof of civil RICO causation has frequently consumed
the courts. Where the complaint alleges an association-in-fact enterprise,
the plaintiff must also prove the various associates' activities and must
278. Sun Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 196 (9th Cir. 1987) (Bums, J.,
concurring). See also id. at 197 (Burns, J., concurring) ("amorphous" and "ill-defined");
Yellow Bus Lines, 913 F.2d at 957 (Mikva, J., concurring) ("nettlesome"); Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 677 (4th Cir. 1989) (calling RICO a "tormented statute"); Warren v.
Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 759 F.2d 542, 543 (6th Cir. 1985) (discussing RICO's
"complications"); Macy's E., Inc. v. Emergency Envtl. Servs., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 191, 193
(1996) (discussing "the arcane eccentricities of RICO jurisprudence"; this jurisprudence
"continues to evolve in uncertain fashion"); Darocha v. Crusader Sav. Bank, No. 94-7264,
1995 WL 118208, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 1995) (calling RICO "a complicated statute");
Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 24 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (discussing "the
arcane mysteries of RICO").
279. Old Time Enters., Inc. v. International Coffee Corp., 862 F.2d 1213, 1220 (5th Cir.
1989); see also Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Mutual Trading Corp., 63 F.3d 516, 522 (7th
Cir. 1995) (discussing RICO's "vagaries"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996).
280. Davies v. Continental Bank, 122 F.R.D. 475, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
281. Waldo v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 722, 737 (W.D. Pa. 1987). See
also Uniroyal Goodrich, 63 F.3d at 522 (discussing the "murkiness of RICO's
parameters").
282. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 465 (1990). See also Central Distribs. of Beer, Inc. v.
Conn, 5 F.3d 181, 184, 186 (6th Cir. 1993) (Wellford, C.J., dissenting) (calling RICO "one
of the most complex statutes ever enacted by Congress" and "a difficult statute fraught
with problems in its interpretation"), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2678 (1994); Chapman & Cole
v. Itel Container Int'l B.V., 865 F.2d 676, 685 (5th Cir.) ("A RICO cause of action by
definition involves complex litigation and high legal costs."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872
(1989); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 1982) (discussing "the complex syntax of the RICO statute"), rev'd in part on other groundsand aff'd in part en banc, 710 F.2d
1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); Witt v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 613 F.
Supp. 140, 144 (D.S.C. 1985) (calling RICO a "complex statute").
283. Occupational-Urgent Care Health Sys., Inc. v. Sutro & Co., 711 F. Supp. 1016,
1022 (E.D. Cal. 1989).
284. After initial uncertainty, courts of appeals now uniformly hold that the ordinary
"preponderance of the evidence" standard applies to proof of all elements of the civil
RICO claim. See, e.g., Richards v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 55 F.3d 247, 249 (7th Cir.
1995).
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establish that these activities evinced a common or shared purpose for a
significant period of time.2 85 To complicate matters further, many multicount civil RICO actions 2allege
separate and distinct enterprises in sup86
port of the various counts.
Efforts to allege and prove a pattern of racketeering activity may produce complex factual and legal questions and ultimately a trial-within-atrial. The pattern may consist of either (1) acts in violation of a single
predicate statute or provision, such as the mail fraud statute, or (2) acts in
violation of more than one predicate statute or provision, such as the mail
fraud statute and the Hobbs Act.2 87 To establish violation of a predicate
statute, the plaintiff must allege and prove all elements of the violation.2 88
To establish a pattern of racketeering activity, the plaintiff must allege
and prove a substantial number of predicate violations extending over
the requisite period.2 89 The frequent result is lengthy pleadings whose
analysis consumes
a considerable amount of judicial time even when dis2 90
missal results.
While struggling to surmount hurdles such as these, the court must
grapple with civil RICO elements characterized by a "murkiness of...
parameters" 2 91 that frequently has denied meaningful guidance. In the
effort to cast its wide net to snare organized crime members and racketeers, Congress left several RICO elements open-ended and largely undefined in 1970. The lawmakers' evident assumption was that courts could
place Mafia and Cosa Nostra mobsters inside RICO's confines without
precisely determining these confines. When the defendant is an ordinary
business or commercial entity rather than a reputed gangster, the task has
been quite a different matter.
These factual and legal issues are time-consuming at each step of the
judicial process. In a civil RICO action, as in any other, the court must
study the parties' submissions and must frequently participate in oral proceedings on dispositive motions and appeals. The court's writings must
marshal and present the operative facts after reflective analysis. RICO's
pattern element makes it likely that these facts will concern intricate
transactions extending back several years.
The court's research and writing then must unravel civil RICO's amorphous legal doctrine and relate it to the facts alleged or proved. In the
285. ABRAMS, supra note 5, § 4.3.2, at 193-94.
286. See id. § 4.7.1, at 222-28.
287. See id. § 5.4.1, at 290.
288. See id.§ 5.3, at 264-65.
289. See id. § 5.7, at 302.
290. See, e.g., Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1435-36 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of civil RICO complaint for failing to contain a short and plain statement of the
claim pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); In re Catanella and E.F.
Hutton & Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1392-93 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (denying defendants'
motion to dismiss civil RICO counts for failure to satisfy Rule 8). Catanellafound the civil
RICO counts "indeed prolix," but concluded that "[t]he plaintiffs.., are alleging the violation of numerous provisions in the federal securities laws, which are complex in their application. This makes 'concise' pleading difficult." Id. at 1401.
291. Uniroyal Goodrich, 63 F.3d at 522.
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frequent situation in which civil RICO's breadth leaves the operative rule
of law unclear, the court must reason toward the result through largely
opaque statutory language and legislative history. Where the rule of law
is shrouded in conflicting civil RICO precedent, the court must analyze
the precedents before determining which authorities are persuasive. Unless the court dismisses without leave to replead, the action may involve
continued proceedings and multiple opinions.
The remainder of this Part of the Article discusses representative examples of the legal uncertainties that have plagued each element of civil
RICO. The discussion, of course, does not suggest that each and every
civil RICO filing has required mental gymnastics from the court en route
to decision. Civil RICO's record does suggest, however, that in a substantial number of decisions, uncertainty has persisted despite judicial efforts to parse available sources of congressional intent.
1.

Injury

Section 1964(c) of RICO provides recovery when the plaintiff proves
proprietary injury "by reason of a violation of section 1962."2 92 At the
very least, this section requires proof of causation in fact. In the absence
of resolution in civil RICO's language and sparse legislative history, however, courts remained split on the precise nature of the causation requirement for more than a decade. Circuits disagreed about whether the
section requires proof that the RICO violation proximately caused the
injury.29 3 Circuits also disagreed about whether the section limits recovery to the "direct" victims of the violation. 294 Because of RICO's Clayton Act antecedents, some courts sought to resolve the direct-injury
question by applying a pass-on theory and then by precluding proof of
295
pass-on.
The profound nationwide split continued until 1992, when the Supreme
Court held that to recover under civil RICO, the plaintiff must prove that
292. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 107, 109 Stat. 737, 758.
Section 1964(c) is discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 188-89.
293. See ABRAMS, supra note 5, § 3.3.3, at 142. Most of the court of appeals and district
court decisions discussed in the remainder of Part III were followed by decisions that dissected their rationales and holdings and proceeded either to apply or reject them. Most of
these citations are omitted from this Part's ensuing footnotes, but appear in ABRAMS,
supra note 5.
294. Id. § 3.3.4., at 142.
295. Id. § 3.3.5, at 144.
[A] suit may implicate so-called "defensive pass-on," where the civil RICO
defendant contends that the plaintiff (the direct victim) suffered no legally
cognizable proprietary injury because the plaintiff passed on any loss to
others in the form of higher costs or prices.... [A] suit may [also] implicate
"offensive pass-on," where the civil RICO plaintiff (assertedly the indirect
victim) alleges that it suffered legally cognizable proprietary injury because
another party passed on loss to it.
The Supreme Court has precluded proof of pass-on in most actions under
civil RICO's model, section 4 of the Clayton Act.
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the RICO violation was the proximate cause of its

injury.

296

Civil RICO's injury element also left other thorny questions unanswered. Must the plaintiff allege proprietary injury from all the predicate

acts, or at least from sufficient predicate acts to constitute a pattern of

racketeering activity? 297 May the plaintiff secure injunctive or other equitable relief on a civil RICO claim? 298 May the defendant secure contri299
bution or indemnity for liability incurred under civil RICO?

Perhaps the most troublesome issue concerning the injury element has
been the statute of limitations for a civil RICO cause of action. Congress
enacted civil RICO without providing an express limitations period. In

the ensuing effort to borrow the most suitable period from another
source, courts could not agree on a single source. Some decisions borrowed the forum state's limitations period for the cause most similar to
the alleged RICO predicate offenses. 300 Even within a particular state,
however, this approach invited inconsistency and uncertainty, depending
on which predicate acts the plaintiff alleged in establishing a pattern of
racketeering activity. 30 1 Particular confusion abounded in the frequent

case in which the plaintiff alleged violations of more than one predicate
statute.
On the other hand, some courts applied a uniform state "catchall" statute of limitations to all civil RICO actions brought within the state. 302 In
1985, the American Bar Association's Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force
characterized the civil RICO limitations issue as "confused, inconsistent,
...unpredictable ...[and] virtually guaranteed to incite complex and
296. See Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).
297. Most courts have answered this question in the negative, holding that where the
plaintiff proves the violation, a civil RICO judgment may be sustained where only one
predicate act caused the plaintiff proprietary injury. See, e.g., Deppe v. Tripp, 863 F.2d
1356, 1366 (7th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff would recover damages for whatever proprietary
injury is caused by any predicate act that helps constitute the pattern. See Pelletier v.
Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1497 & n.67 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855 (1991); Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1067 (3d Cir. 1988), affd on other
grounds,493 U.S. 400 (1990); Deppe, 863 F.2d at 1366-67. But see Pujol v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 829 F.2d 1201, 1205 (1st Cir. 1987) ("There are ... two requirements for
standing under § 1964(c): (1) a plaintiff must show that there has been a violation of
§ 1962, and (2) he must show that his injury was caused by the violation. A violation of
§ 1962 occurs if the defendant committed at least two 'predicate acts."').
298. Most courts have answered this question in the negative. See, e.g., Religious Technology Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103
(1987); see also ABRAMS, supra note 5, at § 3.4.3, at 158 (citing several cases). But see
National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 897 F. Supp. 1047, 1082-83 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(holding that private civil RICO plaintiffs may secure injunctive relief and noting the conflict among the circuits on the question).
299. Courts reaching this question conclude in the negative. See, e.g., Conklin v. St.
Lawrence Valley Educ. Television Council, Inc., No. 93-CV-984, 1995 WL 118465, at *1
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1995) (citing Texas Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630
(1981)); see also ABRAMS, supra note 5, at § 3.4.4, at 162.
300. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 148 (citing authorities that borrowed a state limitations
period).
301. Id.
302. Id. at 148-49 (citing decisions).

19961

LESSONS FROM CIVIL RICO

expensive litigation over what should be a straightforward matter. '303
In its 1987 decision in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,304 the Supreme Court finally held that the four-year statute of limi-

tations applicable to Clayton Act civil enforcement actions applies to civil

RICO actions. 30 5 The Court, however, did not decide when a civil RICO
claim accrues. 30 6 Largely because civil RICO recovery depends on proof

of injury caused by a pattern of predicate statutory violations, the accrual
question remains unresolved
after dozens of decisions grappling with
30 7
RICO's intricacies.

Several circuits have applied the general federal "discovery" rule, holding that a civil RICO claim accrues when the plaintiff discovered or had
30 8
reason to discover the proprietary injury that is the basis of the claim.
Critics of the discovery rule, however, have asserted that a civil RICO

plaintiff might suffer proprietary injury (and thus might discover or have
reason to discover that injury) well before commission of sufficient predi-

cate acts to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity. Critics thus suggest that the rule might conceivably bar a civil RICO claim before the
claim could survive a motion to dismiss.

To avoid this contingency, some courts hearing civil RICO actions ap-

ply a "continuing offense" exception to the general federal rule. 30 9 This
exception sometimes finds application in actions alleging continuous conduct. It provides that a civil RICO claim is timely if at least one predicate
310
act causing the injury occurs within the four-year limitations period.
303. ABA REPORT, supra note 149, at 391-92. See also Reform of the Private Civil
Action Provision of RICO, supra note 161, at 431 ("there are potentially hundreds of limitations periods for civil RICO claims"). See generally Michael J. Lane, Civil RICO: A Call
For a Uniform Statute of Limitations, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 205, 212-225 (1985) (discussing the inconsistent decisions that preceded Malley-Duff).
304. 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
305. Id. at 156.
306. Id. at 157. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (1994), enacted a catchall civil statute of limitations: "Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil
action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this
section may not be commenced later than [four] years after the cause of action accrues."
Congress rejected suggestions that § 1658 apply to previously enacted causes. See H. REP.
No. 101-734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1990), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6870. Because
the section does not apply to previously enacted causes of action, it does not disturb Malley-Duff s holding concerning civil RICO's statute of limitations.
307. Although the Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 determines the accrual period of civil RICO claims actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities, such
claims may no longer be brought unless the defendant is convicted of the fraud. Pub. L.
No. 104-67, § 107, 109 Stat. 737, 758. Where there is a conviction, civil RICO's four-year
statute of limitations begins to run on the date on which the conviction becomes final. Id.
308. See, e.g., Stitt v. Williams, 919 F.2d 516, 525 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Volk v. D.A.
Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987)); Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211,220 (4th Cir. 1987); La Porte Constr. Co. v. Bayshore
Nat'l Bank, 805 F.2d 1254, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986); Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co., 783
F.2d 1011, 1015 (11th Cir. 1986); Alexander v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 729 F.2d 576, 577-78
(8th Cir. 1984).
309. See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. General Elec. Co., 712 F. Supp. 292, 302
(E.D.N.Y. 1989); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ammann, 828 F.2d 4, 5 (9th
Cir. 1987) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
310. The Third Circuit applies a variation of this exception:
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Other civil RICO authorities apply a "separate accrual" rule. Each
time a plaintiff suffers a proprietary injury caused by a § 1962 violation, a
cause of action to recover damages based on that injury accrues to the
311
plaintiff at the time it discovered or should have discovered the injury.

For example, the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that

"with respect to each independent injury to the plaintiff, a civil RICO
cause of action begins to accrue as soon as the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, both the existence and source of his in'3 12
jury and that the injury is part of a pattern.
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit applies a discovery-separate

accrual rule, holding that the limitations period for civil RICO actions
begins to run when a RICO violation exists and the plaintiff knows or
should have known of the injury, even if the plaintiff has not yet discovered the pattern of racketeering activity. 313 Nevertheless, a pattern must

exist before the claim accrues, a requirement that may delay accrual until
after the plaintiff discovers the injury. 3 14 The Seventh Circuit also holds
that a new civil RICO cause of action accrues on the occurrence of each
separate injury. 315 Each wrongful act that causes injury is a new cause of

action, and suit to recover for that injury must be brought within the limi3 16
tations period.

The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case that will enable the Justices to unravel the mess that characterizes civil RICO accrual
decisions. 317 The upcoming decision will be the Court's tenth interpreta[T]he limitations period for a civil RICO claim runs from the date the plaintiff knew or should have known that the elements of the civil RICO cause of
action existed unless, as a part of the same pattern of racketeering activity,
there is further injury to the plaintiff or further predicate acts occur, in which
case the accrual period shall run from the time when the plaintiff knew or
should have known of the last injury or the last predicate act which is part of
the same pattern of racketeering activity. The last predicate act need not
have resulted in injury to the plaintiff but must be part of the same pattern.
If the complaint was filed within four years of the last injury or the last predicate act, the plaintiff may recover for injuries caused by other predicate acts
which occurred outside an earlier limitations period but which are part of the
same "pattern."
Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1130-31 (3d Cir. 1988). See also Glessner v.
Kenny, 952 F.2d 702, 707-08 (3d Cir. 1991) ("there can be separate accrual of the statute of
limitations from new [and independent] injuries").
311. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1007 (1989); Reeder v. Kermit Johnson, Alphagraphics, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 1428, 143839 (D. Utah 1989).
312. Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Bivens
Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Fla., Inc., 906 F.2d 1546, 1554-55 (11th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 910 (1991)); Vesta State Bank v. Independent State Bank, 924
F.2d 155, 156 (8th Cir. 1991); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 82021 (10th Cir. 1990). See also Caproni v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 15 F.3d 614, 619-20 (6th Cir.
1994).
313. McCool v. Strata Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1452, 1465 (7th Cir. 1992).
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 1465-66.
317. See Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,116 S.Ct. 2521 (1996).
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tion of civil RICO since 1985.318 This spate of decisions, each following a
conflict among the circuits, graphically demonstrates civil RICO's persistent complexities and ambiguities.
2. Enterprise

One of RICO's most enigmatic provisions is § 1962(c), 319 the basis of
most civil RICO claims. In particular, courts have struggled for more
than a decade to make sense of the clause that makes it unlawful for any

person employed by or associated with an enterprise "to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity .... "320 Much of the semantic
difficulty arises because the provision inartfully uses the word "conduct"

as a verb and a noun in the same sentence.
For example, in Bennett v. Berg,321 the Eighth Circuit suggested (without deciding) that § 1962(c) requires "some participation in the operation
or management of the enterprise itself."' 322 However, most decisions
reaching the "conduct or participate" element rejected Bennett's restrictive view for overlooking § 1962(c)'s broad language, particularly the "directly or indirectly" phrase. 323 The courts rejecting Bennett frequently
concluded that § 1962(c) applies to "insiders and outsiders-thosemerely
'associated with' an enterprise-who participate directly and indirectly in
the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity .... The
even the smallest fish, those peripherRICO net is woven tightly to trap '324
ally involved with the enterprise.
A District of Columbia Circuit panel rejected Bennett in 1988,325 but

the panel decision was upset on review by the en banc court, which concluded that of the circuits' proliferating tests for determining conduct or
participation, Bennett's formulation "hit closest to the mark. ' 326 The law
stood in disarray until 1993, when the Supreme Court resolved the

the circuits by adopting Bennett's "operation or
profound conflict among
327
management" test.

318. See supra text accompanying notes 168-87.
319. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
320. Id.
321. 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
322. Id. at 1364.
323. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust Sav. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966,
970 (11th Cir. 1986); First Fin. Sav. Bank, Inc. v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 699 F. Supp.
1167, 1172 (E.D.N.C. 1988) ("Section 1962(c) requires only that a defendant be associated
with the alleged RICO enterprise and that he participates directly or indirectly in the management or conduct of the enterprise affairs.").
324. See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1360 (7th Cir.) (citations omitted) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
325. See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 839
F.2d 782, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988), vacated and remanded, 492
U.S. 914 (1989).
326. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 913
F.2d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en bane), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1222 (1991).
327. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993).
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3. Pattern of Racketeering Activity

Before the Supreme Court decided Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 32 8 in
1985, courts deciding civil RICO claims paid only scant attention to the

pattern element. A few decisions concluded or assumed that commission
of merely two predicate acts within the ten-year period constituted a pat-

tern.32 9 Sedima concluded that civil RICO's apparent breadth stemmed

partly from the "failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern.' ' 330 Sedima invited future development in a terse
footnote that lower courts dissected until the Supreme Court amplified
on the pattern element four years later in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co.33 1 The footnote indicated that proof of merely two acts of

racketeering activity, without more, would normally be insufficient to
form a RICO pattern. 332 The footnote stated that the predicate acts must
be marked by "continuity plus relationship," but it provided the lower
33 3
courts little guidance in their struggle to apply these dual concepts.
If the Court believed that the Sedima footnote would help the lower

courts fashion a body of coherent law, the Justices were quickly disappointed. "Relationship," the footnote's second requirement, usually was
not a matter of serious dispute because civil RICO plaintiffs ordinarily
allege predicate acts that have the same or similar purposes, results or
methods of commission. 334 The "continuity" prong, however, was quite
another matter. Justice Scalia was not wide of the mark when he stated

that the four-year struggle to interpret and apply the continuity prong
had produced "the widest and most persistent circuit split on an issue of
328.
329.
1983).
330.
331.

473 U.S. 479 (1985).
See, e.g., Beth Israel Medical Ctr. v. Smith, 576 F. Supp. 1061, 1065 (S.D.N.Y.

Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500.
Id. at 497 n.14. The footnote provided:
As many commentators have pointed out, the definition of a "pattern of
racketeering activity" differs from the other provisions in § 1961 in that it
states that a pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity,"...
not that it "means" two such acts. The implication is that while two acts are
necessary, they may not be sufficient. Indeed, in common parlance two of
anything do not generally form a "pattern." The legislative history supports
the view that two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a
pattern. As the Senate Report explained: "The target of [RICO] is thus not
sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally requires
more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing activity to
be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationshipwhich combines to
produce a pattern .. " Similarly, the sponsor of the Senate bill, after quoting this portion of the Report, pointed out to his colleagues that "[t]he term
'pattern' itself requires the showing of a relationship . . . . So, therefore,
proof of two acts of racketeering activity, without more, does not establish a
pattern . ... "
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
332. Id.
333. See id.
334. See, e.g., Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 1987) ("It is clear
that when ... the acts are part of a common fraudulent scheme, they satisfy the relationship requirement of Sedima.").
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federal law in recent memory. 335
The Eighth Circuit had staked out the most restrictive position, holding
that continuity required allegation of the defendant's engagement in
more than one "scheme." In Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Securities,
Inc.,336 for example, the court of appeals dismissed the civil RICO count
against securities brokers who allegedly made fraudulent misrepresentations to secure the plaintiff's account and then churned the account for six
years by recommending transactions unsuitable to the plaintiff's investment needs. 337 The court held that the predicate acts constituted only
one scheme, even though the acts allegedly continued for a considerable
period. 338 According to the Seventh Circuit in Morgan v. Bank of
Waukegan,339 "defendants who commit a large and ongoing scheme, albeit a single scheme, would automatically escape RICO liability for their
acts. ... "340
No other circuit adopted this multiple-scheme test. In United States v.
Ianniello,341 the Second Circuit adopted a lax approach to continuity,
holding that when a defendant committed two or more predicate acts
within ten years that had the common purpose of furthering a continuing
criminal enterprise with which the defendant was associated, this commission established both relationship and continuity. 342 In a later civil RICO
action, another Second Circuit panel stated that "Ianniello confirms that
two related predicate acts will suffice to establish a pattern .... ,,343 No
other circuit embraced Ianniello's continuing-enterprise test-a test that
the Fourth Circuit concluded would "eliminate the pattern requirement
altogether."' 344 Because commission of fraud invariably involves use of
years, "every fraud would
mail or interstate wire at least twice within ten'345
constitute 'a pattern of racketeering activity.'
In a pair of en banc decisions, the Second Circuit reversed its position
five months before the Supreme Court decided H.J.346 The en banc court
explicitly rejected the multiple-scheme test, but it declared that proof of
two predicate acts without more did not establish a pattern and that the
335. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 251 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also id. at 252 (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that the continuity-plus-relationship standard seems "about as helpful ... as 'life is a fountain'). A circuit-by-circuit
description of the profoundly conflicting decisions appears in ABRAMS, supra note 5, at

§ 5.7.

336. 805 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1986).
337. Id. at 329.
338. Id.
339. 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1986).
340. Id. at 975, quoted in Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 1987).
341. 808 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987).
342. Id. at 192.
343. Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988).
344. International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1987).
345. Id. at 154.
346. Beauford v. Helmsley, 865 F.2d 1386, 1391 (2d Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 492 U.S. 914, on remand, 893 F.2d 1433 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 992 (1989);
United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (same).
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pattern element required related racketeering acts evincing continuous
347
criminal activity or a threat of continuity.

The Seventh Circuit also rejected the multiple-scheme test and announced a multiple-factor test that assumed a middle ground between the
extremes of the Eighth Circuit and Second Circuit. For the Seventh Circuit, continuity depended on such factors as "the number and variety of
predicate acts and the length of time over which they were committed,
the number of victims, the presence of separate schemes and the occur''348

rence of distinct injuries.
The First Circuit refused to adopt the Eighth Circuit's multiple-scheme
350

cited the Seventh Circuit's multiple-factor test with approval,
and concluded that "no one characteristic can be considered as control'351
ling in determining whether a pattern exists.
The Third Circuit rejected the multiple-scheme test 352 and announced a
multiple-factor test of its own, holding that a pattern's existence depended on "specific factors such as the number of unlawful acts, the
test, 349

length of time over which the acts were committed, the similarity of the
acts, the number of victims,
the number of perpetrators, and the character
'353
of the unlawful activity.

On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit "deliberately declined to adopt
any mechanical rules to determine the existence of a RICO pattern .... "354 It opted for a case-by-case determination 35 5 based on con-

gressional intent that RICO "serve as a weapon against ongoing unlawful
activities whose scope and persistence pose a special threat to social wellbeing. '356 In a decision handed down just three months after Sedima, the
Fifth Circuit held that, as a matter of law, two related acts of mail fraud
357
constituted a pattern.
With the law in utter disarray, H.J. attempted to resolve the imbroglio
by distinguishing between open-ended and closed-ended patterns. To
prove a closed-ended pattern or "a closed period of repeated conduct,"
347. Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1390-91.
348. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986).
349. Roeder, 814 F.2d at 31.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1987) (multiple-scheme
test "would exempt from RICO liability defendants who engage in only a single unlawful
scheme, however extensive and injurious").
353. Id. at 39.
354. Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1185 (4th Cir. 1988).
355. Id.
356. International Data Bank v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1987).
357. R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985). Later Fifth
Circuit panels criticized this holding, but they applied it because only the court sitting en
banc may overrule a prior panel's determination. See Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.I.
Case Co., 855 F.2d 241, 243 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1079 (1989).
In an appeal decided a few days before H.J., the Sixth Circuit rejected the Eighth Circuit's multiple-scheme test and expressed approval of the Third and Seventh circuits' multiple-factor approaches. Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1297-98 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1074, and cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
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the RICO plaintiff must prove a "series of related predicates extending
over a substantial period of time. '35 8 To prove an open-ended pattern,
the plaintiff must prove a series of related predicates that, without ex'359
tending over such a period, demonstrates "the threat of continuity.
H.J. has finally provided a measure of coherence to civil RICO pattern
jurisprudence, though it has done little to relieve the burden of complex
factual proceedings. 360 Lower courts generally dismiss civil RICO claims
that are based on allegations of relatively short-lived patterns. 36 1 On the
other hand, lower courts generally sustain civil RICO claims whose alleged patterns demonstrate significant duration, a significant number of
predicate acts, a significant number of participants, a significant number
of victims, or some combination of these factors. 362 In either event, the
evolving pattern jurisprudence continues to invite assertion of civil RICO
claims in private disputes that are entirely beyond the realm of organized
crime and racketeering, the targets Congress and the President were aiming at in 1970 when they enacted RICO.
Unresolved issues thus have plagued civil RICO adjudication for several years, prompting one exasperated court to liken civil RICO to the
proverbial Flying Dutchman: No sooner would courts unravel one
enigma than another would surface in its place. 363 Conflicts in civil
RICO interpretation have diminished in recent years, but only after more
than a decade of Herculean efforts by the federal courts to make sense of
the remedy. In the few weeks between civil RICO's appearance in the
OCCA bill in 1970 and the bill's enactment, nothing in the private remedy's scant legislative history suggests that Congress or President Nixon
had any inkling about the burdens the remedy would ultimately impose
on the federal judiciary.
IV.

CIVIL RICO'S ENDURING LESSONS

This Part discusses lessons from civil RICO's unhappy legacy which can
help guide future legislative and executive consideration of crime legislation. The overarching lesson is that when Congress enacts crime legislation without reflective study in the shadows of an impending political
campaign, the lawmakers run a particular risk that the legislation will fail
to achieve the intended results. Haste makes waste.
Civil RICO also teaches that when Congress seeks to regulate antisocial behavior and to impose sanction for violation of social norms, the
lawmakers must jealously guard the federal judiciary's finite resources.
Lawmakers need to resist the knee-jerk reaction to federalize criminal
law traditionally within the province of the states unless state courts are
358. H.J., 492 U.S. at 241-42.
359. Id. at 242 (emphasis in original).
360. ABRAMS, supra note 5, § 5.6, at 301.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 301-02.
363. See In re Dow Co. "Sarabond" Prods. Liability Litig., 666 F. Supp. 1466, 1470 (D.
Colo. 1987).
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found incapable of performing their traditional role,364 or unless the behavior at issue affects a particularly federal interest or otherwise has sig36 5
nificant interstate or international connections.
Federalization may appear as a "quick fix" to the intractable crime
problem. Like many quick fixes, however, federalization may be destined
for ultimate failure, as civil RICO has failed to advance the battle against
organized crime and racketeering. Even where federalization holds the
potential to achieve some measure of success, however, Congress should
remain wary of upsetting state authority over administration of the criminal law. First, federal entry embarrasses state courts and state
prosecutorial authorities, which appear as subjects of an apparent national mandate that they are no longer equal to the regulatory task. Second, federalization may worsen the already debilitating docket pressures
in the federal courts. New volumes of criminal cases necessarily diminish
the federal courts' capacity not only to focus on criminal prosecutions
truly within their particular competence, but also to expeditiously try civil
actions raising claims under federal statutes central to our polity.
Civil RICO's ultimate lesson is that when Congress and the President
consider crime legislation, they must strive to get it right the first time.
Initial competence may be no mean feat because the legislative process
normally fashions standards before the occurrence of events the standards seek to regulate. Legislation reviews the past and seeks to anticipate the future; courts and litigants later enjoy the relative comfort of
parsing statutory language amid existing disputes from the more secure
vantage of hindsight.
Because legislation normally requires a healthy measure of foresight,
the legislative process frequently features periodic amendment grounded
in wisdom derived from experience with initial legislation. The practical
truth, however, is that initial miscalculation in crime legislation is not always readily correctable. Amendment or repeal may appear prudent
when experience suggests particular crime legislation is ineffective,
counterproductive or unduly harsh. Correction, however, may remain
politically unpalatable because only the hardiest legislators care to risk
appearing "soft on crime" in the age of sound bites and negative
advertising.
In 1985, an American Bar Association Task Force found "a demonstrated need for legislative amendment" of civil RICO. 366 In light of the
private remedy's widespread invocation in suits having nothing to do with
364. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) ("Our Federalism").
365. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1483-84 (D.
Nev. 1992) (a state statute may violate the Commerce Clause if it imposes an improper
burden on interstate commerce), affd, 10 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1543 (1994). Congress has usually grounded federalization of criminal law in the commerce power, which is augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. See U.S. CONST.,
art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Occasionally federalization has been grounded in the taxing power, id. cl.
1, or the postal power, id. cl. 7.
366. ABA REPORT, supra note 149, at 1.
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organized crime and racketeering, the Task Force found the remedy
"grossly overbroad, encompassing business transactions that could not

have been foreseen or intended by Congress. ' 367 From 1985 to 1991,
Congress regularly debated bills to limit civil RICO, whose expansive
reach had indeed blanketed American law. 368 Until the 1995 Securities

Litigation Reform Act, however, each amendment effort failed, largely
because battle lines had been drawn. Powerful constituencies lined up in
favor of amending civil RICO, and powerful constituencies lined up in

opposition. As ill-considered as civil RICO's enactment was in 1970, the
private remedy had assumed a life of its own, fiercely resistant to change.

A. THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL Acr OF 1991
By the summer and autumn of 1991, efforts to enact crime legislation
had been stalled in Congress for three years. President Bush had repeatedly upbraided the lawmakers for inaction, 369 polls reported crime as a
367. Id.
368. Congressional amendment efforts began in early 1985, even before Sedima,
opened the door to broad application of civil RICO. See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Chairman
Promises Hearings on RICO Civil Liability Reform, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 2,
at 57 (Jan. 11, 1985). In 1986, legislation restricting civil RICO's scope passed the House
but was defeated in the Senate. See "Small Investor" Clause May Break Stalemate over
RICO Compromise Talks, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 814 (June 5, 1987);
Dispute Over Securities Exemption May Block Progress on RICO Compromise, 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 782, at 801 (May 29, 1987). After much rancor, renewed efforts
to enact compromise amending legislation failed in 1987. See, e.g., Small Investor Proposal
Engenders Controversy Over Civil RICO Reform, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at
1691 (Nov. 6, 1987); Metzenbaum, Boucher Dispute Threatens Future of Civil RICO Reform Legislation, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1047 (July 17, 1987). Efforts
failed again each year from 1988 to 1991. In 1988, House bills never emerged from subcommittee, while restrictive legislation was favorably reported out of the Senate Judiciary
Committee in May, but was not introduced on the Senate floor despite efforts of some
supporters in October. See, e.g., Attempts to Add RICO Bill as Amendment to Drug Bill
Fail Before Reaching Floor,20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1586 (Oct. 21,1988).
Widespread disagreements also stalled amending legislation throughout 1989. See, e.g.,
Senate JudiciaryDelays Vote on Bill to Reform Civil RICO, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 46, at 1730 (Nov. 24, 1989); DeConcini, Boucher Bill Would Curtail Scope of Civil
RICO, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 309 (Feb. 24, 1989). Legislation also stalled
in 1990 and 1991. See, e.g., Elections Make '92 Unpredictable Year for Legislative Action,
Observers Say, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3 at 76, 78 (Jan. 17, 1992); House Judiciary Committee Approves Proposal to Curb Use of Civil RICO, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 37, at 1343 (Sept. 21, 1990); Senate Judiciary Committee Approves Controversial
RICO Reform Measure, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 197 (Feb. 9, 1990).
369. See, e.g., Remarks at a Luncheon Meeting With Law Enforcement Officials, PUB.
PAPERS 721, 722 (June 25, 1991) ("I'm having great difficulty getting [the Administration's
crime bill] through the Congress, so I hope the American people will speak up and let the
Congress know that this kind of strong anticrime legislation has their support."); Remarks
at a White House Briefing for Law Enforcement Officials on Crime Legislation, PUB. PAPERS 690-91 (June 18, 1991).
We sent a crime bill up [to Congress] [two] years ago, and the American
people say: What in the world is going on? What is taking so long? And I
know I run the risk of 'bashing' the Congress. But that is not what this is
about. It is trying to encourage this lethargic system to do that which the
people want ....
Id. See also Remarks at the FederalBureau of Investigation Academy Commencement Ceremony, PUB. PAPERS 581, 582 (May 30, 1991) (In 1989, "we called on the United States
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major concern of voters, 370 and crime appeared destined to be a major
issue in the national elections the following year.
Against this background, Congress debated the Violent Crime Control
Act of 1991. On the floor in late June, a Senator introduced two amendments that would have conferred federal jurisdiction over all crimes committed through use of a firearm that "has moved at any time in interstate
or foreign commerce. '371 The first amendment would have made any intentional, knowing, or reckless homicide committed with such a firearm a
federal crime punishable by "death or imprison[ment] for any term of
years or for life."'372 The second amendment would have made any other
"crime of violence or drug trafficking" committed with such a firearm a
federal crime punishable by a ten- to thirty-year imprisonment term without release, plus any term otherwise imposable for the underlying
crime. 373 Both amendments stated that federal jurisdiction would "be
used to supplement but not supplant the efforts of state and local
prosecutors." 374
The two firearms amendments were unaccompanied by findings that
state courts had grown unable or unwilling to fulfill their traditional role
in punishing violent street crime. Nor was there any analysis of the institutional costs of federalizing the substantial volume of criminal cases the
two amendments were designed to reach.
At the very least, the Senate should have considered the year-old findings and recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee,
which Congress itself had created in 1988. The lawmakers had directed
the fifteen-member Committee to make a complete study of the courts of
the United States and of the several states. 375 The Committee was to
"examine problems and issues currently facing the courts of the United
States," and to "develop a long-range plan for the future of the Federal
judiciary, including assessments involving ...

the types of disputes re-

solved by the Federal courts. '376 Pursuant to the congressional mandate,
the Chief Justice had appointed committee members from the three federal branches, state governments, universities, and private practice.
The Study Committee's 1990 report warned that the dramatic increase
in federal drug prosecutions had already "threaten[ed] to overwhelm the

Congress to pass our crime package, legislation designed to protect our cops by giving
them the tools they need to get their job done .... Two years have passed, and Congress
has still not acted on our request."); Remarks Announcing Proposed Crime Control Legis-

lation, PuB. PAPERS 244 (Mar. 11, 1991) (In 1989, "we launched an effort to pass our crime
legislation .... And today ... the Congress has still failed to act ...").
370. See, e.g., Howard Goldberg, AP Poll Shows Huge Majority Expects Bush Re-election, AP, June 5, 1991, available in WESTLAW, 1991 WL 6188880.
371. 137 CONG. REc. S8666, S8846 (1991).
372. Id. at S8666 (introduced by Sen. D'Amato for himself and Sen. Thurmond and
Sen. Mack).
373. Id. at S8846 (introduced by Sen. D'Amato for himself and Sen. Dole).
374. Id. at S8666, S8846.
375. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, tit. I, Pub. L. No. No. 100702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 1 (1994)).
376. Id.
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79

resources of the federal courts. '377 The Committee concluded that
"[b]oth the principles of federalism and the long-term health of the federal judicial system require returning the federal courts to their proper,
'3 78
limited role in dealing with crime.
Sheer numbers underscored the Study Committee's findings and gave

the lawmakers reason to question the wisdom of the two firearm amendments. The most recent Uniform Crime Reporting document compiled
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported approximately 11,830
firearm homicides nationally in 1989, the last year for which figures were
available. 379 Approximately 143,000 violent crime and drug trafficking
cases involving firearms were filed in state courts annually. 380 About

95% of firearms have passed through interstate or international commerce at some point, which in 1989 would have accounted for 11,240
38 1 If
homicide cases and 135,850 violent crime and drug trafficking cases.
only a relatively small percentage of the new federal criminal defendants
defined by the two firearms amendments would have proceeded to trial
in federal court, federalizing such a vast array of state crimes would likely
382
have debilitated the federal judiciary.
377.

FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY

See also id. at 6 ("The expanded
federal effort to reduce drug trafficking has led to a recent surge in federal criminal trials
that is preventing federal judges in major metropolitan areas from scheduling civil trials,
especially civil jury trials, of which there is now a rapidly growing backlog."); id. at 36
(providing statistics).
378. Id. at 36. The Committee stated:
Many of the new drug cases now flooding the federal system could be prosecuted just as effectively in state courts, under state laws. Over-reliance on
federal courts for drug prosecutions will either force Congress to bloat the
federal courts beyond recognition or force the federal courts to stop meeting
their other constitutional and statutory responsibilities.
Id.
379. See JUDICIAL IMPACT OFFICE, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL IMPACT STATEMENT: VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AT OF 1991 8 (Sept. 23, 1991)
[herinafter JUDICIAL IMPACT STATEMENT].
COMMITTEE 160 (1990) [hereinafter STUDY COMMITTEE].

380. Id. at 18.
381. Id. at 8, 18; see also 137

CONG.

REc. S8668 (remarks of Sen. D'Amato) (quoting

U.S. Justice Department figures).
382. Docket pressures threaten the quality of justice not only in the federal courts, but
also in the state courts. See, e.g., BRIAN J. OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER, EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1994: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS

PROJECT 50 (reporting that "[ciriminal case loads the state courts reached an all-time high

of nearly 13.5 million filings in 1994"); J. Anthony Kline, Comment, The Politicalizationof
Crime, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1087, 1087-88 (1995) ([P]ressure created by increased criminal
caseloads "has had a much greater impact on state than federal courts ....
); Judith S.
Kaye, Federalism Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1994, at A29, ("A solution that eases
the burden on the Federal courts without taking into account the effect on the state court
system is no solution at all."). But see, e.g., Jon 0. Newman, 1,000 Judges-The Limit for
an Effective Federal Judiciary,76 JUDICATURE 187, 194 (1993) ("A reallocation of 70,000
cases from federal courts to state courts would reduce federal court volume by 30 percent
while increasing state court volume only 1 percent.").
As an alternative to federalization, the Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United States recommends additional federal support for state authorities in the prosecution and adjudication of crime: "There should be an increase in
federal resources allocated to state criminal justice systems for prosecution of matters now
handled by federal prosecutors because of lack of state resources." COMMITTEE ON LONG
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The two firearms amendments threatened to compromise further the
federal courts' capacity to devote requisite attention to criminal prosecutions truly within their particular competence and concern. These would
include prosecutions whose magnitude lies beyond an individual state's
capabilities, such as major criminal RICO conspiracy prosecutions, prosecutions of major white collar crime, and other offenses of substantial
scope. They would also include prosecutions otherwise involving particu-

larly federal interests or significant interstate or international connections.383 Federal concern does not become weighty merely because the
defendant is charged with using one of the ninety-five percent of domestic firearms that happen to have passed through interstate or international commerce at one time or another.
The two firearms amendments also would likely have further eroded
the federal courts' capacity to expeditiously try civil actions, including
ones raising claims under federal statutes central to our polity, such as the
civil rights acts, securities and antitrust laws, and legislation regulating
health, environmental protection, and workplace safety. The Study

Committee found that because the Speedy Trial Act effectively gives
criminal actions precedence on crowded dockets, "some districts with
heavy drug caseloads are virtually unable to try civil cases and others will
RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED LONG

RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS,
after PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN].

Recommendation 4a, at 26 (Mar. 1995) [herein-

Even if we agree that lawmakers should be wary of proposals that would ease federal
pressures by redirecting substantial categories of criminal or civil cases to state courts, the
concerns are different when the debate concerns proposals to federalize a particular category of criminal cases. Because the category has traditionally been within state jurisdiction, maintenance of the status quo would not increase state dockets. Where the category
does not otherwise involve particular federal concerns, the determinative question should
be whether state prosecutors and courts can continue effectively to prosecute and adjudicate cases within the category (with or without federal assistance), or whether federal jurisdiction would enhance effectiveness.
383. See PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 382, at 23-25. The Committee recommended the following:
Congress should allocate criminal jurisdiction to the federal courts only in
relation to the following five types of offenses:
(a) The proscribed activity constitutes an offense against the federal government itself or against its agents, or against interests unquestionably associated with a national government; or the Congress has evinced a clear
preference for uniform federal control over this activity. ...
(b) The proscribed activity involves substantial multistate or international
aspects....
(c) The proscribed activity, even if focused within a single state, involves a
complex commercial or institutional enterprise most effectively prosecuted
by use of federal resources or expertise. ...
(d) The proscribed activity involves serious, high-level or widespread state
or local government corruption, thereby tending to undermine public confidence in the effectiveness of local prosecutors and judicial systems to deal
with the matter ....
(e) The proscribed activity, because it raises highly sensitive issues in the
local community, is perceived as being more objectively prosecuted within
the federal system ....
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soon be at that point. ''384

Aside from federal judicial docket constraints, questions remained concerning whether federal law enforcement budgets could have borne the
costs of investigating and prosecuting yet another inundation of criminal
actions throughout the nation and whether federal corrections authorities

could have borne the costs of incarcerating yet more prisoners in already
overcrowded federal prisons. The truth is that when Congress creates
new federal crimes, it frequently does not couple the legislation with ap-

propriations to help manage the new burden.
The two firearms amendments warranted Senate study even if significant numbers of the new alleged federal criminals ultimately were tried
and sentenced in state court or agreed to federal plea bargains. Where

prosecution of an alleged firearms-related crime remained in the federal
system, the Speedy Trial Act and chronic docket pressures suggested that
plea bargaining might frequently be driven more by the federal courts'

limited institutional capacities, than by a particular prosecution's merits.
Evenhanded administration of criminal justice would suffer whenever the
choice between charging a defendant in federal or state court would depend not only on these limits, but also on the relative ambitions of federal

and state prosecutors who share dual jurisdiction. Fairness issues would
also arise because, as Professor Beale has written, dual jurisdiction helps
lead to inequitable treatment of similarly situated defendants. 385 Because
of limits on federal prosecutorial resources, most persons accused of par-

ticular conduct will continue to be tried in state courts, with only a relative few subject to ordinarily harsher federal penalties. 3 86

384. STUDY COMMIT-FEE, supra note 377, at 36. See also Roger J. Miner, Crime and
Punishment in the Federal Courts, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 681, 686 (1992) [hereinafter
Miner, Crime and Punishment in the Federal Courts] (recounting conversation with judge,
who said that the criminal caseload had prevented him from trying any civil cases for more
than a year); Stephen Labaton, Federal Judges Blame Money Woes for Slowdown, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 1993, at B16; Michael deCourcy Hinds, Bush Aides Push State Gun Cases
into U.S. Courts, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1991, at Al ("Federal judges ... are alarmed that
their dockets are increasingly filled by cases involving drugs and guns, while important
constitutional issues like civil rights ... actions await hearings for months or years"; "civil
cases are slipping farther down the Federal court docket" and federal courts' "backlogs are
growing," in significant part because the number of drug cases increased five-fold from
1980 to 1990, while the number of district judges increased by only about 10%); Stephen
Labaton, New Tactics in the War on Drugs Tilt Scales of Justice Off Balance, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 29, 1989, at Al ("Drug cases are dominating already overcrowded dockets, and ...
tens of thousands of civil lawsuits ... are being pushed aside and subjected to enormous
delays as a result"; surge in drug-related prosecutions is "leading to unprecedented delays
in Federal courts for civil litigants who are seeking to resolve ... civil rights actions ....
;
stating that one district judge could try only one civil action in two years and had twenty
civil actions prepared for trial without the time to try them).
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1994), requires that a criminal defendant in federal court be given a trial within seventy days of indictment. See, e.g., STUDY
COMMrrrEE, supra note 377, at 36 (discussing the Speedy Trial Act's effect on federal civil
docket).
385. Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper
Limits for Federal CriminalJurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 981-82 (1995).
386. Id. at 982.
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Beyond the pressures and potential inequities created by docket constraints, the Senate should have considered what one judge has called
"the disappointment of promises unfulfilled. ' ' 387 When Congress federalizes a crime, the inevitable message is that the federal presence will be a
potent force to combat the perceived threat. If (as is unfortunately
likely) homicides and other violent firearms crimes continue with a frequency beyond the effective nationwide control of federal law enforcement authorities and the federal courts, Congress and the federal

government will388likely bear the lion's share of public scorn for perceived

ineffectiveness.
Before voting on the two firearms amendments, the Senate failed to
address any of these questions. After only a few minutes of floor debate

and without hearings, the Senate overwhelmingly approved the two
amendments. The first amendment, which would have federalized homi-

cides committed with a firearm that had passed through interstate or international commerce, was approved by a vote of sixty-five to thirtythree. 389 The second amendment, which would have imposed a
mandatory ten- to thirty-year federal prison sentence for any other crime

committed with such a firearm, was approved by a vote of eighty-eight to

eleven. 390 A few days later, the Bush Administration expressed its support for both amendments. 39 1 On July 11, 1991, the Senate approved the

entire crime bill by a vote of seventy-one to twenty-six and sent it to the
392

House.
Judges then began posing the hard questions the Senate had ignored
when it hurriedly approved the two firearms amendments. In late September, the Judicial Conference of the United States publicly opposed
the amendments, which it said "will swamp the Federal courts with routine cases that states are better equipped to handle, and will weaken the
ability of the federal courts effectively to deal with difficult criminal cases
that present uniquely federal issues."'393 Federal courts would also be left
387. Roger J. Miner, The Consequences of Federalizing Criminal Law: Overloaded
Courts and a Dissatisfied Public,4 CRIM. JUST. 16, 19 (Spring 1989). See also Miner, Crime
and Punishment in the Federal Court, supra note 384, at 687 ("Great expectations lead to
great disappointments, an unfortunate consequence of too many federal crimes.").
388. FBI Director Sees Danger of Overload, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1993, at A32 (address
by FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, warning that "unchecked federalization of crime could
overwhelm federal law enforcement, including the FBI, and create unrealistic expectations
among the public").
389. 137 CONG. REc. S8672 (June 26, 1991) (2 not voting).
390. Id. at S8851 (one not voting).
391. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Citing Caseload, Federal Judges Assail 2 Provisions in
Crime Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1991, at 19 [hereinafter Hinds, Citing Caseload](statement
of Assistant Att'y Gen. for Legislative Affairs Lee Rawls).
392. 137 CONG. REC. S9832 (3 not voting) (July 11, 1991). See id. at S9982, for the text
of Senate Bill 1241.
393. Position of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Enclosed in Letter from Chief Justice
Rehnquist, PresidingOfficer of the Judicial Conference, to Rep. Jack Brooks, Chairman of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary,140 CONG. REC. S6090 (May 19, 1994) (remarks of Rep.
Biden). See also Gwen Ifill, Rehnquist Opposes Bill That Seeks Shift in Gun Trials to US.
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1991, at 8 (quoting letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist to the
House Judiciary Committee); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ChiefJustice's 1991 Year-End Re-
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"unable to carry
out their vital responsibilities to provide timely forums
'394
for civil cases.

Judge Vincent L. Broderick of the Southern District of New York, formerly the New York City Police Commissioner, denounced the amendments as "simplistic" and "politically expedient," 395 stating that "once

these cases move into Federal court, we would do nothing else; we'd be
like a municipal court. ' 396 "There's a deathly fear out there ... of run-

ning for office and being thought to be soft on crime," Judge Broderick
' 397

continued, "and that is what is driving us today.
Also questioning the wisdom of the two firearms amendments was the
Judicial Impact Statement on the Act, prepared by the Judicial Impact
Office of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.398 The Statement
estimated that possible annual costs to the federal judiciary of the first
amendment (relating to homicides with firearms) would range from $31
million and 187 work years, to $2.7 billion and 16,365 work years. 399 (The
estimates included the cost of judicial officers and their support staff time,
as well as the cost of other court personnel, public defenders, and admin-

istrative support. A "work year" represents one person working full-time
°°
4
for one year.)

Equally daunting was the Impact Statement's estimates of the possible
annual costs of the second amendment (relating to other violent crimes
with firearms). If all cases involving such crimes were prosecuted in the
federal courts, the estimated resource cost would exceed $1.030 billion
and 14,970 work years. If only 5% of such cases were prosecuted in the
federal courts, the projected cost would be about $54.6 million and 793
401
work years.
The House passed its crime bill October 22, 1991.402 Perhaps influenced by the judicial voices and by the Judicial Impact Statement, the
port on the FederalJudiciary24 THIRD BRANCH 1, 5 (1992) (The two firearms amendments
"would have insured that the already overburdened federal courts could not provide a
timely forum for civil cases.").
394. Id.
395. Henry J. Reske, Get-Tough Crime Bill Spurs Critics: Former ABA President,
Judges Say Amendments Would Burden Federal Courts, 77 A.B.A. J. 32, 32 (Oct. 1991).
396. Hinds, Citing Caseload, supra note 391, at 19.
397. Reske, supra note 395, at 32.
398. See JUDICIAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 379.
399. Id. at 8. The higher figures represent the annual cost if all firearm homicide cases
nationally were prosecuted in federal court and if authorities sought the death penalty in
each case. The lower figures represent the annual costs if only 5% of firearm homicide
cases were brought in federal court in the fifteen jurisdictions that did not provide for the
death penalty. Each calculation is based on the premise that approximately 95% of firearm homicides involve firearms that have moved through interstate or foreign commerce.
Id. at 8-9.
400. Id. at 1. The Statement's impact estimates did not include annual resource costs to
the Supreme Court and the United States Sentencing Commission. Id.
401. Id. at 18. These calculations are based on the premise that approximately 95% of
firearm homicides involve firearms that have moved through interstate or foreign commerce. Id.
402. See 137 CONG. REC. D1288 (Oct. 22, 1991); see also OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL
ACT OF 1991, H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. H7892, H7916 (1991).
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House-Senate conference committee approved a compromise bill that deleted the two amendments. The compromise bill died in a last-minute
filibuster by Senators who asserted that it did not go far enough in reappeals and in relaxing restrictions on illegally
stricting death penalty
40 3
seized evidence.
B.

THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
OF 1994

ACT

With efforts to enact crime legislation again thwarted, crime became a
central issue during the 1992 presidential campaign. Shortly after President Clinton's Inauguration, crime legislation again assumed center stage
4 °4
in Congress, whose members recognized voters' continuing concerns.
After floor debate spanning nearly a year, the Omnibus Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act became law on September 13,
1994.405 The 1994 Act contains provisions that confer federal jurisdiction
over a number of state crimes.
When the federalization provisions arose, House and Senate debates
heard only fleeting discussion of two crucial questions: (1) Were the state
courts unable or unwilling to perform their traditional role in administering the criminal law? and (2) Would federal jurisdiction produce docket
pressures that would compromise the federal courts' capacity to perform
their core functions in adjudicating civil and criminal law within their particular competence? 40 6 The findings and recommendations of the 1990
Federal Courts Study Committee again went unmentioned.
Before the 1994 crime bill reached the President's desk, Senate-House
conferees had deleted sections, resurrected from 1991, that would have
federalized virtually all crimes committed with firearms. 40 7 As it was,
however, the 1994 Act added more than one hundred new federal crimi403. See 137 CONG. REc. Hi1678 (Nov. 26, 1991); see also Paul Houston, Crime Bill
Succumbs to Republican Senate Filibuster,L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1991, at A30.
404. See, e.g., Stephen Braun & Judy Pasternak, A Nation with Perilon its Mind; Crime
Has Become the Top Concern of Many People, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1994, at Al (in L.A.
Times poll, 43% of Americans put crime issues at the top of the nation's problems); Richard Morin, Crime Time: The Fear, The Facts; How the Sensationalism Got Ahead of the
Stats, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1994, at C1 (in a Washington Post-ABC News poll, 31% of
Americans name crime as the nation's top problem, and half the persons interviewed
named it as one of the country's top two problems).
405. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13701
(1994).
406. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S14,948-49 (Nov. 3, 1993) (remarks of Sen. D'Amato);
id. at S15,393 (Nov. 9, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Biden); id. at S15,395 (Nov. 9, 1993) (remarks of Sen. D'Amato); id. at S15,396 (Nov. 9, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Feingold); id. at
S15,398 (Nov. 9, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Biden); id. at S15,524-25 (Nov. 10, 1993) (remarks
of Sen. Leahy); 140 CONG. REC. H2325 (Apr. 14, 1994) (remarks of Rep. Scott); id. at
H2325-26 (Apr. 14, 1994) (remarks of Rep. Glickman); id. at H2326 (Apr. 14, 1994) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); id. at S6090-93 (May 19, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Biden); id. at
S6092-94 (May 19, 1994) (remarks of Sen. D'Amato); id. at S6099-S6104 (May 19, 1994)
(remarks of Sen. Biden); id. at S12,296-98 (Aug. 23, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Feingold); id. at
S12,309-11 (Aug. 23, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Leahy).
407. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1993, H.R. 3355, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2405.
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nal provisions. 40 8 Some of the provisions authorized enhanced penalties
for existing federal crimes (including the death penalty for approximately

sixty offenses) or created new circumstances in which federal courts may
impose existing penalties. Other provisions created new federal crimes.
Two examples illuminate the issues raised by the latter category of
provisions. 40 9 The 1994 Act grants federal courts jurisdiction over prosecutions alleging drive-by shootings in furtherance of or to escape detection of a major drug offense. 4 10 The Act also reaffirms federal
jurisdiction over persons charged with knowingly possessing guns in or
41
near public, private, or parochial schools. '
408. See William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV.
719, 746-54 (1995) (appendix listing the provisions).
409. See also Violence Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA"), Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit.
IV, §§ 40001-40703, 108 Stat. 1902-55 (federalizing specified interstate acts of domestic violence); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit.
XV, §§ 150001-09, 108 Stat. 2033-36 (Criminal Street Gangs; federalizing specified acts involving participation in such gangs).
Unlike other recent congressional enactments federalizing crime, VAWA was preceded
by several hearings and reports that illuminated the issue of, and enabled lawmakers to
make more informed judgments about, whether states were able to shoulder the
prosecutorial burden and whether federal involvement might have a positive effect. See,
e.g., SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
ACT OF 1993, S.REP. No. 103-138, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN Act OF 1991, S. REP. No. 102197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Crimes of Violence Motivated By Gender, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights, House Judiciary Comm., 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Violence Against Women: Fighting the Fear, Hearings Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Violence Against Women, Hearings
Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Hearings on Domestic
Violence, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Violence Against Women, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Crime and CriminalJustice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary,102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); Violence Against Women: Victims of the System, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); Women and Violence, Part1,Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, US. Senate, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Women and Violence, PartII, Hearings Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary, US. Senate, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
410. 18 U.S.C. § 36 (1994), added by Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. VI, § 60008(b), 108 Stat.
1796, 1971 (1994). See also id. § 36(a) (defining "major drug offense").
411. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), added by Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XXXII, § 320904, 108 Stat.
1796, 2125 (1994). The 1994 legislation amended the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,
which the Supreme Court struck down a few months later for exceeding Congress's commerce power. United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995). The 1990 Act forbade "any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A), quoted in Lopez, 115
S. Ct. at 1626. A "school zone" was "in, or on the grounds of, a public, parochial or private
school" or "within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial or private school." Id. § 921(a)(25), quoted in Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1626 n.l. See also id.
§ 921(a)(26) (defining "school"). Writing for five-member majority, Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist concluded that the Act fell outside the commerce power because it neither
regulated a commercial activity nor contained a requirement that possession be connected
in any way to interstate commerce. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31. (Rehnquist, C.J., joined
by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, J.J.).
The Lopez majority noted that the 1990 Act was unaccompanied by a jurisdictional element and by congressional findings stating how the proscribed conduct, in the aggregate,
affected interstate commerce. Id. In an evident effort to save the constitutionality of the
1990 Act, the 1994 legislation articulated such findings even before the Court's Lopez decision. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)-
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Not only did the provisions creating new federal crimes further challenge the federal courts' institutional capacities, but they also left the
state courts embarrassed again by the apparent national mandate that
they were unequal to the regulatory task. Federal presence is not war-

ranted by the mere fact that the defendant happens to be charged with
shooting someone while committing or escaping from a major drug offense on a city street or with possessing a firearm in or near a schoolyard.
All states already criminalize such shootings. More than forty states
criminalize possession of firearms on or near school grounds, 412 and Con-

gress in 1994 did not cite any findings indicating that states were unable
or unwilling to prosecute.
Shortly after the President signed the crime bill, the Long-Range Planning Committee of Judicial Conference of the United States warned of
"nightmarish" consequences arising in part from the already exploding
federal criminal docket. 4 13 The Planning Committee report did not consider the effects of the 1994 Act's extension of federal criminal jurisdiction. Committee chair Judge Otto R. Skopil, Jr. of the Ninth Circuit
effect
warned, however, that the extensions "could have a very, very large
'4 14
on criminal caseload [making t]he possibilities ... staggering.
The Committee had been created after the 1990 Federal Courts Study
Committee recommended that the judiciary should establish a "permanent capacity to determine long-term goals and develop strategic plans by
which they can reach those goals."'415 The Planning Committee report,
written by the Committee's nine federal judges, advised that if present
(I)). Lopez, however, did not consider the 1994 findings because the government did not
rely on them as a substitute for the absence of findings in the 1990 Act. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
at 1632 n.4.
Evidently concerned that mere congressional findings might not be sufficient to withstand commerce clause challenge, the President submitted proposed legislation less than
two months after Lopez to amend the 1990 Act by requiring proof that the firearm had
moved in interstate commerce. See 141 CONG. REC. S6459 (May 10, 1995) (message from
the President); id at S7920 (June 7, 1995) (text of proposed legislation).
412. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Respondent's
Brief at 24, United States v. Lopez, cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (Apr. 18, 1994) (No. 931260) (naming forty-two states).
413. See PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 382, at 18. While Congress was
debating the 1994 Act, the Judicial Conference reiterated its opposition to widespread federalization of crime, which would "adversely impact on the ability of the federal courts to
function as intended." 139 CONG. REC. S15,398 (remarks of Sen. Biden, presenting letter
of Judge Maryanne Trump Barry, chair of the Judicial Conference Committee on Criminal
Law). Judge Barry wrote:
[T]he federal courts are designed to handle complex criminal cases ... with
nationwide impact that states lack the resources and/or jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute .... [T~he potential addition to the federal caseload of
thousands of cases that the states routinely and efficiently prosecute would
severely reduce if not cripple the federal courts' ability to handle those types
of cases that we are best able-and geared-to handle.
Id. See generally WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER & RUSSELL W. WHEELER, ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1994).
414. Robert Pear, Judges Proposing to Narrow Access to Federal Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 1994, at Al.
415. STUDY COMMITIEE, supra note 377, at 147.
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trends continue, federal district court civil filings could number more than
a million annually by the year 2020, compared to approximately 230,000
filings in 1993. Also, criminal filings could number nearly 90,000, compared to approximately 47,000 filings in 1993. To manage and dispose of
this projected caseload would require more than 2500 district judges and
current number
nearly 1600 court of appeals judges, as compared to the
416
of 649 district judges and 167 court of appeals judges.
The Planning Committee recommended that "[w]hen legislation is considered that may affect the federal courts directly or indirectly, Congress
should take into account the judicial impact of the proposed legislation,
' 417
including the increased caseload and resulting costs for federal courts.
The recommendation explicitly cited crime legislation, which "inevitably
imposes financial and other burdens on the judicial branch associated
with ... investigation, prosecution, resolution and punishment .... 418
The Planning Committee further recommended that "criminal activity
should be prosecuted in a federal court only in those instances in which
is not appropriate or where federal interests are
state court prosecution
4 19
paramount."
V. CONCLUSION
Irony has marked civil RICO's record since the private remedy's enactment in the politically charged 1970 crime bill. The roll of civil RICO
defendants has included individuals and entities from nearly all walks of
American life. Virtually absent from this roll, however, have been
RICO's intended targets: persons engaged in organized crime and racketeering. Civil RICO's war against organized crime and racketeering has
spared the targets, while producing a continuing casualty list of ordinary
individuals and businesses tarred as "racketeers" in civil pleadings and
court decisions throughout the nation.420
For most of the last quarter-century, civil RICO has sullied public perceptions of the congressional process and has exposed Congress to persistent ridicule. 42 1 Civil RICO has been an ongoing national
embarrassment, not only because its operation has never been faithful to
should have foreseen
congressional intent, but also because Congress
422
civil RICO's failure to hit the intended targets.
416. See PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 382, at 18.
417. Id. at 36.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 23.
420. See, e.g., Douglas E. Abrams, Should Crime in the Suites Come Under Racketeering
Law?: A Burden Congress Shouldn't Impose, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1986, at 30; Douglas E.
Abrams, Making Racketeers Of Everyone, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 3, 1985, at 3B.
421. See, e.g., James D. Gordon, III, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100 YALE L.J.
1679, 1696-97 (1991) (describing an "honest list" of law school course descriptions, including "RICO: Learn how to use this powerful anti-extortion law to extort large settlements
out of honest business people").
422. RICO also exemplifies a disturbing trend that has frequently seen Congress enact
ill-defined and overly broad legislation, evidently complacent that the courts would some-

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

By the time the 1995 Securities Litigation Reform Act finally limited
civil RICO's expansive reach, Congress had already begun to look silly as
persons from all walks of life found themselves named as a racketeering
statute's defendants, with the House and Senate unable to do anything
about it for more than a decade. As it is, the 1995 Act is a piecemeal
amendment, affecting only securities fraud actions, while leaving civil
RICO otherwise untouched.
In the years since RICO's enactment, congressional consideration of

crime legislation has frequently followed the disquieting scenario that
helped produce civil RICO. A stern measure creating federal jurisdiction
is brought to a House or Senate vote without careful consideration of the

measure's likely effect on crime or on the courts' institutional capacities.
Observers have suggested that lawmakers frequently introduce stem
crime measures without expecting enactment, and even privately hoping
423
against enactment because they sense the measure's imprudence.
In the age of sound bites and negative political advertising, however,

merely introducing a stern crime measure may serve at least two immediate purposes. Supporters can boast about being "tough on crime," and

they can tar opponents with the obloquy of being "soft on crime." If
cooler heads prevail and the measure fails on the floor or is deleted in
conference, supporters nonetheless have positioned themselves for the
next election campaign. If some lawmakers doubt the measure's wisdom
or wish further study, but nonetheless feel disabled from voicing opposition, the measure may find its way into the United States Code.
Congress's civil RICO mistakes are capable of repetition because in

the contemporary climate, "hardly a congressional session goes by without an attempt" to advance the "trend toward large-scale federalization
of the criminal law."'424 In 1991 and 1994, lawmakers again debated
measures to federalize aspects of crime control. With respect to at least
how fill in the gaps. Courts, after all, may not decline to hear cases properly brought
before them, even when the decision turns on inartfully drafted legislation. See, e.g., Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 595 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("The effort
to determine congressional intent here might better be entrusted to a detective than to a
judge."); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Inviting JudicialActivism: A "Liberal" or "Conservative"
Technique?, 15 GA.L. REv. 539, 547 (1981) (discussing "the murky, buck-passing brand of
legislation that casts unwanted construction and application burdens on the courts");
Douglas E. Abrams, Lack of Clarity in Writing Laws Leads to Confusion, Court Cases,
NEWSDAY, Apr. 8, 1985, at 50 ("RICO is yet another example of poorly written legislation
whose scope far exceeds the mischief Congress sought to remedy.... In an era of heightened sensitivity to finite judicial budgets and resources, dozens of inconsistent private
RICO decisions demonstrate the burden that ill-defined, imprecise legislation casts on the
judicial system.").
423. See, e.g., Crime Bills: A Lethal Batch, But Many Will Die, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,

Oct. 28, 1991, at F6 (quoting Professor of Government Benjamin Ginsberg, Cornell Univ.
Center, Washington, D.C.).

424. William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts,
1993 Wis. L. REv. 1, 7. See also Richard S. Arnold, The Future of the Federal Courts, 60

Mo. L. REv. 533, 540 (1995) ("[T]he urge in Congress to create new federal causes of
action, civil and criminal, is not abating."); William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks:
National Conference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships, 78 VA. L. REV. 1657, 1660
(1992) (calling for "congressional self-restraint" in the federalization of crime).
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some of the proposed new federal crimes, they left the disturbing sense
that they had barely paused to study the measures' likely efficacy or their
potential effect on the courts. Commentators could not be faulted for

concluding that many lawmakers again opted for federalization more
from desire for personal publicity, than from serious belief that enactment would truly advance the battle against crime. 425
If our streets are to be safe and our federal and state courts are to use

their finite resources efficiently in the administration of civil and criminal
law, we need to demand more fortitude from elected leaders who debate

crime legislation in the public interest. A quarter-century of experience
Even before enactment of the 1994 crime bill, the 1990s had already seen an acceleration
in the federalization of crime. See, e.g., Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519,
106 Stat. 3384 (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.) (federalizing car theft by person
possessing a handgun); Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-346, 106
Stat. 928 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 43) (federalizing disruption of animal enterprises, such as
laboratories); Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-521, 106 Stat. 3403
(codified in various sections of 18, 42 U.S.C.) (federalizing failure to pay child support);
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(25), 922(q)(1)(A)) (federalizing possession of a gun within 1000 feet of a
school; struck down by the Supreme Court for exceeding Congress's commerce power, but
its ultimate constitutionality remains uncertain after the 1994 crime bill's amendments, see
supra note 411 and accompanying text). See also False Identification Crime Control Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-398, 96 Stat. 2009 (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028, 1738, 39 U.S.C.
§ 3001) (prohibiting fraud in connection with identification documents); Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1030)
(prohibiting computer fraud).
425. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, A Catalogueof JudicialFederalismin the United States,
46 S.C. L. REV. 835, 875 (1995) ("[T]his generation of politicians views the federal laws as a
public policy panacea and the federal courts as one of their services to their constituencies."); Sanford H. Kadish, Comment, The Folly of Overfederalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
1247, 1248-49 (1995) (discussing "congressmen and women following the politically profitable example of state legislators in buying popularity with essentially bogus anticrime
laws"); Marshall, supra note 408, at 724 ("[I]t is seldom a vote winner to assert that one is
not going to vote for a popular crime measure on the grounds that it conflicts with a theoretical vision of federalism."); Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime:
Some Thoughts on Saving the FederalJudiciary from the Federalizationof State Crime, 43
U. KAN. L. REV. 503, 504, 507 (1995) ("[W]e live at a time when legislators, state as well as
federal, are zealous in their efforts to be tough on crime, or at least to create the appearance of toughness"; discussing "most elected officials' overwhelming political incentive to
fight the war on crime by legislating it to death"; "persuading Congress to stop federalizing
most criminal behavior . . . may be politically naive."); H. Scott Wallace, The Drive to
Federalize Is a Road to Ruin, 8 CRIM. JUsT. 8, 51 (Fall 1993) (discussing "public impatience
and political pressures"); Michael Kinsley, The Case Against the States, TIME, Jan. 16, 1995,
at 78 ("Although crime is traditionally a matter for state and local government, politicians
in Washington these days compete vigorously to federalize the most categories of criminal
behavior .. "); Anthony Lewis, Response to a Threat, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1994, at A15
("The public is fearful and members of Congress vote to federalize law enforcement so
they can say they are against crime."); Robert D. Raven, Don't Wage War on Crime in
Federal Courts, TEX. LAW., Aug. 31, 1992, at 12 ("Because being tough on crime plays well
at the ballot box, federal politicians in both the legislative and executive branches have
embarked on a well-publicized war against crime."); George F. Will, Government on a
Leash, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1994, at C7 ("It is no longer startling when Congress asserts
that some local problem-any problem-comes within its purview, and the 1990 [GunFree School Zones] act, another step in the federalization of criminal law, doubtless was
compatible with public opinion."). The 1990 Act is discussed supranote 424 and accompanying text.
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with civil RICO serves as a grim reminder of what can happen when
haste overcomes reasoned analysis.

